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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
AND THE ACQUISITION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND IMPACT OF ARRA FUNDS
by
NakHyeok Choi
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Howard Frank, Co-Major Professor
Professor Hai Guo, Co-Major Professor
This dissertation examined transportation grants provided to states under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Some states acquired more grants and
utilized them in a timelier manner than others. This dissertation examined why this is the
case, utilizing System Theory and Resource Based Theory as the intellectual framework.
Human resource and financial resource capacities were viewed as the principal drivers of
success and studying this managerially controllable variables underpin the analysis.
Though many studies have examined ARRA since 2009, my dissertation is the first
to simultaneously examine the three stages of the ARRA transportation grant process:
acquisition, implementation, and impact. There are three research questions, aligned with
the three stages: (1) what factors affect state governments in the acquisition of competitive
grants? (2) what factors affect state governments in the implementation of competitive and
vi

formula grants? and (3) what factors affect state governments in expenditure recovery and
transportation investment?
Government Capacity consists of four components, namely human resources,
financial resources, general management, and experience. I used three regression models
(log-linear for the first, and panel corrected standard error for the last two) to test the impact
of the government capacity on grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. Overall, the
test results showed that three dimensions of government capacity played a significant role
to varying extents with respect to ARRA: human resource, financial resource, and
experience.
States with higher government capacity [strength (S) of capacity] turned the threat
(T) of the Great Recession into an opportunity (O) for the restoration and development of
transportation, and compensated for their weakness (W). The dissertation concluded that
specific aspects of Government Capacity were thus relevant predictors of the acquisition,
implementation, and impact of ARRA grants. Findings also support prior research that
quality, not quantity of personnel may of signal import to organizational capacity during
times of fiscal stress.
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Chapter I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation of the dissertation
Government Capacity (GC) is a pivotal ability for governments to perform their policy.
GC, defined as the ability of government, was characterized as human resource, financial
resource, intelligent decision, management, system, etc., according to several studies
(Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Donahue, Selden, & Ingraham, 2000; Honadle, 1981).
Adapting and developing the concept of GC, many descendant studies reported that the
performance of government (organization) depends on GC (e.g., Christensen & Gazley,
2008; Hall, 2008b; Hou & Moynihan, 2008; Howlett, 2009). These studies argue that
governments with more capacity are likely to outperform other governments with less
capacity.
As such, the significance of GC seems to be undebatable in the field of public
administration. However, there are several points that have not been clearly established.
How does GC work in crisis situations? Which components of GC work well (and which
do not work well)? Many studies have focused on GC, but few have focused on the role of
GC in overcoming crisis. Moreover, although many studies have presented components of
GC, few empirical studies have proposed a systemic framework for components of GC.
In these respects, the present dissertation utilizes the most recent economic crisis,
the Great Recession (December 2007- June 2009), and the Recovery Act as a U.S. policy,
to investigate the role of state government capacity in a crisis. The Recession is an
appropriate case for testing state government capacity because it universally impacted all
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states; however, there was variability in recovery across states after the federal policy was
enacted.
More specifically, the Recession jeopardized state governments in that states faced
considerable and abrupt revenue cuts. The severe fiscal distress threatened the states’
abilities to provide core public services and to invest in economic development. However,
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), enacted to remedy the
serious situation with a stimulus package, helped mitigate the fiscal distress. No state
economy was immune to the effects of the Great Recession, and the ARRA simultaneously
provided every state with an opportunity for economic relief.
The dissertation examines the aforementioned situation and investigates ARRA
grants. Some states acquired more grants and some states implemented grant-funded
programs better than others. Additionally, regarding the ARRA objective to recover
government expenditure and to increase investment in transportation, this study examines
why some states performed better than others in transportation expenditure recovery and
transportation investment. This dissertation aims to explain this variability using GC
components as independent variables.
In the next sections, I introduce ARRA and the ARRA transportation grants,
propose a schematic model and research questions with hypotheses, present the
significance of study, and describe the organizational structure of the dissertation.
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1.2. ARRA and transportation grants
The present study examines transportation grants from the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) under ARRA (also referred to as the Recovery Act). The reason why
the dissertation takes ARRA transportation grant as the case of the study is that research on
this grant remains scarce. Many studies have examined ARRA in terms of its effects (e.g.,
Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, & Woolston, 2012; Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, & Wieland,
2010; Conley & Dupor, 2013; Johnson, 2009; Manna & Ryan, 2011; McGuinn, 2012), but
transportation investment—an aim of the Recovery act—has received comparatively scant
attention in the research literature. So, it is meaningful to research how ARRA
transportation funds were distributed; how the funds were implemented by recipients; and
how effective the funds were in transportation expenditure recovery and transportation
investment at the recipient level. Before starting the presentation of the research, the next
section briefly introduces ARRA and ARRA transportation grant programs to provide
background of the case.

1.2.1. ARRA grants
The goal of ARRA was to spur economic activity during the Great Recession.
Specific aims of the act include job preservation and creation, economic recovery,
investment in transportation and infrastructure, and relieving subnational government
fiscal stress to provide essential services. To achieve these goals, the federal government
distributed funds to states and localities through several grant programs (Wyatt, 2009, p.
128). As of 2009, more than half of the ARRA funds (63%) were used for Medicaid,
3

another 13% of the funds were allocated to State Fiscal Stabilization Funds, and 24% of
the funds were allocated to other programs (United States Government Accountability
Office, 2009). Drawing from the portion (24%) allocated to other programs, 28 federal
agencies provided several grant programs to subnational governments. This dissertation
focuses on the grant programs—specifically, the funds distributed by the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT).
The ARRA grant programs were categorized into two types: a formula based grant
and a competitive grant (or a discretionary grant). Competitive grant programs were
distributed to recipients at the discretion of each federal agency. Formula grants were
allocated by a formula with pre-determined multiple criteria. Competitive grants are useful
in that recipient governments can apply for and acquire the grants according to their own
plan created to meet their unique needs. However, the grant competition demands
significant costs for preparing grant applications, even though the dollar-amounts of these
grants are much lower than those of formula grants. For example, a total of $47 billion was
distributed by the federal DOT to state level recipients under the Recovery act—$34 billion
was designated for formula and block grants and $12 billion was designated for
discretionary grants. The distributed amount and number of grants vary considerably across
the U.S. states. This study distinguishes the two grant programs in the context of an
investigation of ARRA grants.
In terms of the impact of ARRA, it has been evaluated as a successful policy.
Scheppach (2012) stated that “ARRA was quite effective” because the act was a well-timed
intervention compared to most previous fiscal policy. ARRA funds were disbursed to
4

“stabilize both the aggregate economy and state spending” in a timely manner. Without the
subsidized funds, “states would have had both to cut spending and to increase taxes
substantially more” due to the balanced budget rules during the severe period of revenue
cutback triggered by the market shock. So, ARRA played a significant role in preventing a
pro-cyclical situation and a deeper and longer recession (p. 948).

1.2.2. ARRA transportation grant
This dissertation examines transportation grants under ARRA. The term,
transportation “comprises the functions of Highways, Air transportation, Parking facilities,
Water transport and terminals, and Transit subsidies.” 1 The Recovery Act describes
specific transportation programs of ARRA grants: competitive and formula grants.
Competitive grant programs of DOT are (1) Supplemental Discretionary Grants for a
National Surface Transportation System, (2) Highway Infrastructure Investment, (3)
Grants-in-aid for Airports, (4) Supplemental Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards, (5)
Capital Investment Grants, (6) Capital Assistance for High Speed Rail Corridors and
Intercity Passenger Rail Service, and (7) Capital Grants to the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation. Formula grant programs of DOT are (1) Fixed Guideway Infrastructure
Investment, (2) Transit Capital Assistance, and (3) Highway Infrastructure Investment. A
category of the Highway Infrastructure Investment program includes both a competitive
and a formula grant.

1

https://www.census.gov/govs/state/definitions.html
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Table 1 Status of Recovery Act Transportation Projects, Obligations, and Expenditures
Number of projects
Program

Awarded Completed

Obligations
(in millions)
Amount Percent
obligated

Expenditures
(in millions)
Amount Percent
reimbursed

Federal Highway Administration
Highway
12,931 8,124
$26,335 99.90%
$19,550
infrastructure
investment
Federal Railroad Administration
High
speed 78
0
5,671
71.1
200
intercity
passenger rail
Amtrak
154
110
1,291
100.0
1,291
Federal Transit Administration
Transit capital 1,010
170
7,294
100.0
4,567
assistance
program
(TCAP)
Fixed
51
24
743
100.0
468
guideway
infrastructure
Capital
11
11
743
100.0
743
investment
grants
Office of the Secretary of Transportation
TIGER grants 51
0
1,482
98.8
104
Federal Aviation Administration
Grants-in-aid 372
365
1,086
98.9
1,055
for airports
FAA facilities 399
381
198
99.0
143
and equipment
Maritime Administration
Assistance to 70
36
98
100.0
79
small
shipyards
Total
15,127 9,221
44,941 95.0
28,200
Note. Values in the table are as of May 31, 2011.
Source: United States Government Accountability Office (2011, p. 8)
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74.20%

3.5

100.0
62.6

63

100.0

7.0
97.1
72.2

80.6

62.7

The Recovery Act, Title XII, states that six federal agencies of DOT operate
different kinds of programs. Table 1 above describes detailed information of ARRA
transportation grant by agency, regarding transportation projects, obligations, and
expenditures. First, the Office of the Secretary distributed $1.5 billion for Supplemental
Discretionary Grants for a National Surface Transportation System, which was used for
capital investments in surface transportation infrastructure. Second, the Federal Aviation
Administration operates two programs: “Supplemental Funding for Facilities and
Equipment” ($200 million) and “Grants-In-Aid for Airports” ($1.1 billion). “Supplemental
Funding for Facilities and Equipment” is used for necessary investments in the Federal
Aviation Administration infrastructure: power systems, air route traffic control centers, air
traffic control towers, terminal radar approach control facilities, and navigation and landing
equipment. “Grants-In-Aid for Airports” is for installation and commissioning of runway
incursion prevention devices and systems at airports. Third, the Federal Highway
Administration carries out the “Highway Infrastructure Investment” program, in which
$27.5 billion was distributed, and the funds were used for highway restoration, repair,
construction, and other activities. Fourth, the Federal Railroad Administration managed
two programs: “Capital Assistance for High Speed Rail Corridors and Intercity Passenger
Rail Service,” with $8 billion, supports the development of intercity high speed rail service;
and “Capital Grants to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,” with $1.3 billion,
was used for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), for repair,
rehabilitation, or upgrade of railroad assets or infrastructure. Fifth, the Federal Transit
Administration has three programs, which are “Transit Capital Assistance” ($6.9 billion),
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“Fixed Guideway Infrastructure Investment” 2 ($750 million), and “Capital Investment
Grants” ($750 million) for additional discretionary programs. Sixth, the Maritime
Administration manages the “Supplemental Grants for Assistance to Small Shipyards”
with $100 million.
The Recovery Act has a restriction provision for state governments to use DOT
funds. The “Maintenance of Effort” (MOE) provision 3 regulates states to spend a certain
amount of funds that are from their own sources. If a state fails to meet the MOE, the state
will be restricted from receiving additional funds from DOT in the future. 4

2

“A ‘fixed guideway’ refers to any transit service that uses exclusive or controlled rights-of-way or
rails, entirely or in part. The term includes heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail, monorail, trolleybus,
aerial tramway, inclined plane, cable car, automated guideway transit, ferryboats, that portion of motor
bus service operated on exclusive or controlled rights-of-way, and high-occupancy-vehicle (HOV)
lanes.” (http://www.transportation.gov/livability/grants-programs#Fixed Guide Systems)
3

“The Governor of the State shall certify to the Secretary of Transportation that the State will maintain
its effort with regard to State funding for the types of projects that are funded by the appropriation. As
part of this certification, the Governor shall submit to the Secretary of Transportation a statement
identifying the amount of funds the State planned to expend from State sources as of the date of
enactment of this Act during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act through
September 30, 2010, for the types of projects that are funded by the appropriation.” (Sec. 1201. (a), the
Recovery Act)

4

“If a State is unable to maintain the level of effort certified pursuant to subsection (a), the State will
be prohibited by the Secretary of Transportation from receiving additional limitation pursuant to the
redistribution of the limitation on obligations for Federal-aid highway and highway safety construction
programs that occurs after August 1 for fiscal year 2011.” (Sec. 1201. (b), the Recovery Act)
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1.3. Schematic Model, research question and hypothesis
In this section, I will briefly describe the schematic model to provide the logic flow
of the dissertation and present research questions and hypotheses. Detailed explanations of
the logic and research questions will follow in Chapters III and IV.
As explained in the motivation section, this dissertation began with the intellectual
curiosity of why there was variability among states in terms of grant acquisition,
implementation, and impact. To explain the variability, I focus on government capacity
(GC), generally regarded as a significant factor for government performance.
Specifically, the purpose of this study is to investigate the three stages of the ARRA
grants process: grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. I investigate (1) what affects
state governments in the acquisition of competitive grants; (2) what affects state
governments in the implementation of competitive and formula grants; and (3) what affects
state governments in expenditure recovery and spending.
The major explanatory variable is government capacity (GC), which is expected
to play an essential role as an independent variable to explain the three stages of ARRA
grants. In addition to GC, several other factors affect the grant process. The schematic
model (Figure 1) below depicts the logic flow of this dissertation, specific factors, and the
relation between the factors and the explained variables.
The fundamental logic is based on Systems theory; that is, indicating
input/throughput decides output. The study regards the three outputs (grant acquisition,
implementation and impact) as performance, and the input/throughput factors as the drivers
9

of performance. In the model below, the border lines indicate boundaries of the system.
Rectangular lines surround the internal system—in which GC, state politics, fiscal
institution, and legislative control are explanatory variables for the outputs. Outside of the
system, the outputs are also affected by state needs, federal politics, and federal grants.
However, compared to internal factors, external factors are too difficult for state
governments to manage. In Chapter III, I present specific components of these factors by
applying the Resource Based Theory (RBT).

Figure 1 Schematic Model

To investigate the three stage of ARRA transportation grant, I propose three
research questions and related hypotheses. Detailed explanations of each rationale per
question will be presented in Chapter IV.

10

Research question 1: Why do some states receive more ARRA grants than others and
to what extent does this depend on government capacity?
Research question 2: Does government capacity affect the implementation of ARRA
grants? If so, to what extent?
Research question 3: To what extent did ARRA grant aid affect the transportation
expenditure recovery and state transportation investments?
H1. Governments with higher capacity would receive a greater amount of ARRA
competitive grants.
H2. Governments with higher capacity would implement a greater proportion of
obligated ARRA grants within the first two years.
H3a. ARRA grants will positively affect the transportation expenditure recovery
(Recovery impact).
H3b. ARRA grants will impact the transportation investment (Reinvestment
impact).

1.4. Significance of Study
The dissertation is significant in terms of several contributions to the research
literature and to practitioners. First, the study proposes a theoretical framework for the
association between government capacity (GC) and performance. Prior literature has
mostly sidestepped the theory development of GC, instead depending on practical
11

approaches or on authors’ intuition and experience. By utilizing Systems Theory and
Resource Based Theory (RBT), I devise a framework of logic flow to explain the relation
between GC and ARRA transportation grants.
Second, I propose the concept and the measurement of GC based on the theoretical
framework. Most prior empirical studies employed a proxy for GC—without suggesting a
relevant theory, merely citing other articles. Moreover, some of previous literature avoided
theoretical explanations for why their measurement components represent GC. Based on
RBT, I propose a framework to capture the concept and the components of GC.
Third, this dissertation is the first study to examine the three stages of ARRA
transportation funds: acquisition, implementation, and impact. So far, few studies on
ARRA transportation grants have been published, though some policy areas of the ARRA
have been studied; for example, energy funds (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Fisher, 2015;
Terman & Feiock, 2014), education (Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012), and total funds
(Young & Sobel, 2013). Thus, this dissertation on ARRA transportation grants can also
contribute to transportation policy studies.
Lastly, this study suggests several policy implications for practitioners. I provide
some evidence of GC’s importance in ARRA grant competition and implementation. This
is a policy implication for practitioners in that GC is effective even in crisis; individuals
and organizations must continue to enhance capacity even during times of calm. Moreover,
I find statistically significant evidence concerning the effects of grants on state
expenditures—though the effect differed according to the type of grant and to the type of

12

expenditure. The results may provide advice on the usefulness of grant type in different
types of expenditure.

1.5. Organization of the dissertation
The dissertation consists of six chapters. The next chapter presents a
comprehensive literature review in three parts—according to the three research
questions—and critiques gaps in the literature. Chapter III proposes theory development,
in which I present the framework, based on two background theories (Systems Theory and
RBT), to explain the link between GC and performance regarding ARRA transportation
grants. In addition, the study conceptualizes government capacity by referring to previous
literature and presents a framework for the concept and components of GC. Chapter IV
describes the three models for the three research questions, in which I present estimation
routines and data. Chapter V unpacks the empirical results of the models. Finally, Chapter
VI presents a summary of the dissertation, a discussion of the results, and the limitations
of the study.

13

Chapter II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter II presents three groups of the research literature reviews, organized into three
sections dedicated to grant acquisition, grant implementation, and grant impact. First, a
review of the literature on grant acquisition is presented—divided into two groups of
studies: the public administration literature focusing on government capacity (GC) and the
political science literature focusing on federal politics. Second, several studies are reviewed
that focus on the relationship between government capacity and grant (or policy)
implementation. The discussion includes research that accounts for how and why GC is
important in policy implementation and includes studies that analyze the role of GC
specifically in ARRA implementation. Lastly, regarding empirical analysis of grant impact,
I present basic economic theories of grant impact on governments and determinants on
government expenditure.

2.1. Literature review on Grant acquisition
Prior research has provided useful insights into why some governments receive
more grant money than others, yet some important factors have not been studied
sufficiently. Most political science studies on grant allocation have mainly focused on the
effect of political factors on the outcomes of grant cycles. Scholars have examined the
federal politics of pork barrel projects (i.e., projects in which government money has been
appropriated specifically to bring money to a representative's district)—using the following
main explanatory variable: number of congressmen from each state on the relevant
committees (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel, 2013).
14

However, the role of subnational governments has been largely neglected, despite their
active involvement in the development of grant projects.
The following sections review the public administration literature on government
capacity (GC) and the political science literature on federal politics.

2.1.1. Government capacity for federal fund attainment
Several public administration studies have focused on the role of government
capacity pertaining to grant allocation. The studies argued that level of government
capacity affects the acquisition of federal funds. Investigating federalism, Manna and Ryan
(2011) asserted that applicants’ capacities increase the possibility of winning grant
competitions. The authors presented three key factors for operating competitive grant
programs: “applicant capacity, applicant need 5 , and politics 6 ” (p. 533). Results of the
regression models indicated that government capacity variables had positive effects on
submitted applications, and that population and education budget positively affected grant
proposal scores. The authors concluded that government capacity is an important variable.
Regarding grant acquisition, Johnson (2009, p. 124) asserted that government capacity is
important to the search for eligible grants and the application preparation process. Johnson
reported that staffs of low capacity municipalities spent significant time just to determine

5

The variable, states’ ‘need’ was measured by the percentage cut to the state education budget and
poverty rate.
6
The variable, ‘politics,’ was operationalized as the party affiliation of the governor, with the
expectation that Republican governors are less likely to seek federal money.
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whether or not their governments were eligible to apply for a competitive grant. It implies
government capacity (or capability) would play an essential role in the preparation of
application and in the achievement of the grant. Collins and Gerber (2008) compared
government capacity and local needs to determine which factor was more important in
predicting fund allocation. Using data analysis, they asserted that higher administrative
capacity was “a consistent driver of funding allocation” (p. 1137).
What can be a rationale about why government capacity (GC) is significant on
grant application and allocation? Some scholars have suggested that GC is a good means
by which grantors can screen out disqualified applicants and also a good point for grantees
to induce grantors’ decision. Terman and Feiock (2014) asserted that “grantors use capacity
as one means to discriminate between governments that are more or less likely to succeed
in carrying out the goals of the grant” (p. 6). Moreover, Collins and Gerber (2008)
presented their rationales for why higher level of administrative capacity is critical to grant
procurement, focusing specifically on search costs and monitoring costs. Grantors aim to
fund successful programs; grantors should mitigate their risks of selecting applicants with
a higher likelihood of failure in implementing grant programs. Thus, for grantors who
assume that grantees with higher capacity are more likely to succeed in implementing the
grant programs, administrative capacity—which is reflected by “the professionalism and
complexity” —is a “heuristic to reduce search costs,” which incentivizes grantors to select
higher capacity applicants (pp. 1131-1132).
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2.1.2. Federal politics
The political science literature in this area of research has focused on the federal
politics that pertain to grant allocation. In these studies, the main assumption is that the
distributive policy is decided by pork barrel politics—politicians try to secure funds for
their political interests [e.g., political (electoral) support for their districts]. In these studies,
typical political variables are: Congressional members from each state that serve on
relevant committees (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel,
2013), average tenure-length of Congressional members from each state (Young & Sobel,
2013), Senate over-representation (Hauk Jr & Wacziarg, 2007; Larcinese, Rizzo, & Testa,
2013; Lauderdale, 2008), composition of party affiliation in Congress (Balla, Lawrence,
Maltzman, & Sigelman, 2002; Levitt & Snyder, 1995), and presidential partisanship or
support to the president (C. R. Berry, Burden, & Howell, 2010; Young & Sobel, 2013).
This section introduces examples from the political science research literature.
Young and Sobel (2013) examined ARRA funds given to 50 states and the
determinants that affected ARRA fund allocation from the federal government and the U.S.
Congress. Using four different groups of independent variables—Keynesian determinants
of countercyclical policy 7, Congressional power and dominance 8, Presidential electoral

7

Keynesian determinants of countercyclical policy are unemployment rate and change, state tax
revenue growth, level and growth change of real state per-capita GDP, marginal propensity to consume
in state (MPC).

8

Political variables include federal grants and payments to state & local governmnts (FEDAID),
FEDAID/federal revenue, average tenure-length of state’s representatives and senators, number of state
prepresentatives sitting on the appropriations committee in the House and Senate, and Democrats (or
Republicans) on the appropriations committee. The authors also added: the funds for four departments
(Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Education, Department of Transportation,
and Department of Energy), total members and each party’s members sitting on the House and Senate
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vote maximization 9 , and demographic variables—the authors tested whether the
independent variables affected total ARRA spending and the four departments’ funds,
which were divided into “funds announced and funds made available 10.” Analysis of the
2009 data revealed that federal money received in the previous year was important to
acquire ARRA funds. Tenure of House members had positive effects on total ARRA fund
allocation, but Tenure of Senate members had negative effects. States that Barrack Obama
won in 2008 were likely to receive ARRA funds rather than other states. Moreover,
Democratic members of committees and subcommittees significantly affected fund
allocation to their states. Their study provides a comprehensive approach to test ARRA
fund allocation with multiple dimensions of explanation: economic conditions, presidential
effects, and congressional effects.
Larcinese et al. (2013) studied the effects of population dynamics on the allocation
of federal budget. Criticizing previous literature that used state size (population) as an
explanatory variable for variations in federal money allocations, the authors divided the

appropriations and authorization subcommittees, and total members and each party’s members on the
authorization subcommittee of the House.
One of the variable groups is the electoral importance measure (Y), measured by Y = 1 − 4 ×
(X − 0.5)2 , where X means % of a state’s popular vote won by Barrack Obama in 2008. The other one
is a dummy, with a value of 1 if Obama won the state in 2008.
9

10

(1) Funds Announced by an agency means “Funds that have been publicly announced as available
to entities outside of the federal government. Not all available funds are announced publicly. For
example, the funds going to a project started prior to the Recovery Act that are commingled with the
project’s Recovery funds will not be announced publicly before being made available to a recipient).
The Funds Announced figure should not be viewed as the total funding that an agency has made
available.” (2) Funds Awarded (Obligated by the federal agency) to a Recipient means “Funds that
have been made available to a recipient.” (3) Funds Paid Out (Gross Outlay) by an Agency means
“Funds
that
a
federal
agency
has
paid
out
to
a
recipient.”
http://www.recovery.gov/arra/FAQ/Pages/glossaryHome.aspx
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population effects into slow- and fast-growing, and stressed that the most important factor
was speed of growth rather than an absolute size of a state. They used outlays data of federal
budgets from 1978-2002, and adopted regression models, such as OLS and fixed effects.
Their independent variables were Senators per capita that implies Senate overrepresentation 11, State population, and Population index 12. Other control variables were
socio-economic variables 13 . The authors concluded that small population size was
important in federal budget allocation, but slow population dynamics was more important
than the size of a state. More specifically, a fast-growing small state was likely to lose
federal money compared to a slow-growing large state (p. 279). In addition, among six
categories 14 of dependent variable, Senators per capita had a positive effect on grant
allocation without the population index variable, but had no significant effect with the
population index variable that had a negative sign for allocation.
Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe (2012) investigated reasons why the ARRA funds were
not distributed to economically disadvantaged counties. To explain the reasons, the authors
adopted two models: Policy Windows and Pork Barrel. From the rationale of the Policy
Windows model, preexisting policy goals (e.g., energy, health care technology,
infrastructure and education) were occasionally coupled with issues that the ARRA aimed

11

Senator per capita is 2/population, and the over-representation index is (2/state population)/(96/US
population)=US population/48* state population).
12

Population Index = Each year’s population/ base year (1978)’s population

13

Socioeconomic variables include income, unemployment, % aged above 65, % within schooling age
(5-17)

14

The dependent variable is measured as total federal spending, direct payments to individuals, grants,
salaries, defense expenditure, and federal spending on except defense.
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to address (which were triggered by the Great Recession). The funds were allocated to
pursue those shared goals as long as grantees did not deviate from the aims of the Recovery
Act. The authors ultimately showed, via the results of their quantitative analysis (OLS) —
which used expenditure data of total ARRA funds and infrastructure spending—that
variables of the Policy Windows model 15 explained much more of the ARRA funds than
variables of the Pork Barrel model 16.
Rich (1989) researched determinants of federal grant allocation. After reviewing
theories of Political-Business Cycles, Pork Barrel Politics, Bureaucratic Politics 17 , and
Grantsmanship, he criticized that prior literature oversimplified the determinants as only
political variables. For example, the Political-Business Cycle model explains that
governments expand their spending during the period encompassing national elections. He
said that the model does not sufficiently explain grant allocation, because Congress must
legislate a grant program’s creation and the modification of rules for grant programs, and
because the President must also persuade Congress into agreement with his policy change.
Moreover, the Pork Barrel Politics model explains “the norms of universalism and

15

Variables for the Policy Window model were National Institutes of Health, National Parks, Number
of airports, Interstate mileage, U.S. highway mileage, Water area, Number of PhDs granted by local
universities, % Employed in computing and science, % Employed in health and social services, and %
Employed in state and local government
16

Variables for the Pork Barrel model were Counties represented by a committee of House
Transportation member, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce member; Counties represented by
a committee of Senate Environment and Public Works and Appropriations member; Total members of
House serving county; % Democratic House members serving county; % Democratic senators serving
county; and % Democratic presidential vote 2008

17

“Bureaucrats allocate expenditures both in gratitude for past support and in hopes of future
congressional support; and congressmen support agencies both because they owe them for past
allocations and because they desire future allocations” (Arnold 1979, p. 36 as cited in Rich 1989, p.
196).
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reciprocity” with congressmen’s political interests, which induce the allocation of funds to
programs that impact a broad number of districts. However, according to Rich, the work of
Congress primarily concerns agreement with “overall program authorization,” except for a
few programs, and most substantial decision making is conducted by bureaucrats. Thus, he
argued for a comprehensive approach, encompassing “political influence, community
needs, and local demand and administrative capacity.” From the regression results, local
demands, prior experience on a grant program, local needs 18, and House members variable
had positive effects on the amount of federal aid awarded.

2.2. Literature review on Grant Implementation
2.2.1. Government capacity and policy implementation
Various prior studies have emphasized that government (or organizational)
capacity (GC) plays an essential role in policy implementation success for recipient
governments (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou, Moynihan, & Ingraham, 2003; McDermott,
2006). Fredericksen and London (2000) explained that organizational capacity to
implement a policy is a fundamental factor in the decision-making of agencies that allocate
funds to recipients. They also asserted that the success in policy implementation depends
on the capacity of the grantee or the contractee. McGuire, Rubin, Agranoff, and Richards
(1994) stated, citing a couple of articles (Mead, 1986; Sokolow, 1989), small communities

18

Local needs were measured by population change, employment change, per capita income change,
unemployment, poverty, among others.
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are “less well off” and lack organizational and managerial capacity, so these communities
are less likely to have adequate abilities to implement development projects (p. 426).
Honadle (1981) suggested that the definition of capacity comprises several dimensions 19,
and she indicated that capacity is the ability to “develop programs to implement policy” (p.
577). Hou et al. (2003) examined management capacity, by adopting their research project,
the Government Performance Project (GPP). They proposed five management systems—
“financial management, capital management, human resources management, information
technology, and managing for results”— and suggested that the five components “act as
enablers to policy implementation” (p. 297). Collins and Gerber (2006) suggested a
postulate regarding the relation between capacity and implementation. They stated,
“…local governments with greater capacity are more likely to implement programs that
comply with state and federal regulations” (p. 618). McGuinn (2012) insisted that
insufficient capacity and political constraints would hinder the policy implementation of
governments (p.147), while Gamkhar and Pickerill (2012) similarly argued that “fiscal and
institutional capacity constraints at the state and local levels have become real obstacles to
sustaining meaningful reform.”
In an investigation of education policy, McDermott (2006) presented the case
study of Massachusetts education reform and stressed the importance of government
capacity. Aside from the other two factors for success (i.e., incentive structure and trust) in
the implementation of education reform, lack of government capacity is the critical point

19
The dimensions include the ability: to anticipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent
decisions about policy; develop programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage
resources; and evaluate current activities to guide future actions.
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that can hinder policy implementation. For example, McDermott asserted that “insufficient
administrative capacity hindered use of sanctions and also limited the state Department of
Education’s ability to provide assistance for underperforming schools and districts” (p.51).
The necessary condition for government capacity encompasses human and financial
resources, even though governments do not have fully sufficient resorces (p. 54).

2.2.2. Government capacity and ARRA implementation
Researchers have examined the effect of GC on the implementation of the ARRA
program. Carley et al. (2015) examined whether or not federal guidance and state capacity
affect a state’s speedy spending of ARRA energy funds. They set the dependent variable as
the percentage of actual expenditures of obligated ARRA energy funds—in which a higher
percentage indicates that a state spent the energy funds rapidly (or efficiently) to meet an
objective of the Recovery Act. Using a fractional logit model, the authors found that
government capacity20 and guidance were positively associated with spending of ARRA
funds.
Terman and Feiock (2014) investigated factors affecting outcomes that were
measured by the delay of implementation. Using their own survey data on the Energy
Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG) Program, the authors tested the
involvement of the city council and the mayor and government capacity, with other control

20
It is measured with “some combination of relevant technical skills, the existence and leveraging of
relevant organizational experiences, adequate resources, the cognitive skills necessary to learn and
adapt, and human capital or adequate personnel resources” (p. 116).
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variables. Among the five variables, only the lack of staff capacity was statistically
significant and negatively affected the implementation delay. The authors interpreted that
negative effects were produced because governments “self-select into project types where
less staff capacity is necessary” (p. 18). Terman and Feiock (2015) studied municipalities’
perception of the ARRA program (EECBG) time rules, which require recipient
governments to implement ARRA projects in a timely manner. Though their key
independent variables were the use of third-party implementers (e.g., contractors), the
authors employed government capacities as control variables (i.e., administrative capacity,
policy capacity, and management structure). The results of their ordered logit regression
indicated that policy capacity had negative effects, which means a higher capacity
government is less likely to suffer from the time rule. However, the management structure
variable had positive effects, which implies a council-manager form of government would
be in a disadvantaged position to overcome the time rule.
Table 2 provides the summary of studies that I reviewed above. It shows the
measurement of GC, dependent variables, research method, data, and effects of GC on
dependent variables.

24

Table 2 Literature of ARRA fund and government capacity
Studies

Capacity

Dependent Var.

Method

Effects

Carley et
al. (2015)

Government
relevant
experience,
financial
management
capacity
Administrative
capacity,
Policy
capacity,
Management
structure

ARRA energy fund
spending

Fractional
logit,
Generalized
linear

+

Energy Efficiency
and Conservation
Block Grant
(EECBG),
Perception on rules
of time limits as an
obstacle
deviation in days of
delay for project
from the average
number of days of
delay

Ordinal
logit

Policy
capacity (-),
Management
structure (+)

Hierarchical
cross-level
random
effects
model

Lack of staff
capacity (-)

Terman
and Feiock
(2015)

Terman
and Feiock
(2014)

Overall
capacity,
Managerial
capacity,
Dedicated
sustainability
staffing,
lack of staff
capacity,
lack
information
resource

2.3. Literature review on Grant Impact and Government Expenditure
2.3.1. Theoretical background of grant impact
Before discussing grant impact, we must first identify how to classify types of
intergovernmental grants. Figure 2 presents the way of grant typology with four criteria:
the condition on use, the method of grant allocation, whether or not a grant requires
matching funds, and the limit of grant size.
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Conditon on use:

Allocation method:

Matching:

Limit on grant size:

Categorical Grants
(use intended for specific activity)

Formula

Lump-sum
(no spending
required)

Project

Matching

Close-ended
(grant
amount
limited)

General grants
(no use restrictions)

Formula

Lump-sum
(no spending
required)

Revenue
sharing
(tax-effort
mattersvariable match)

Open-ended
(no limit on
grant
amount)

Figure 2. Types of intergovernmental grants. Adapted from Fisher (2007, p. 204)

First, according to the conditions of use, we can distinguish general grants and
categorical grants. “Federal intergovernmental grants to state government all are
categorical grants” (Fisher & Bristle, 2012, p. 224); ARRA grants—which are instances of
states spending federal grant funds—have restrictions on their use. Second, we can
distinguish between method of allocation: formula and project grants. As described above,
ARRA includes both methods of allocation. Formula grants were allocated according to
preset criteria, and project grants were distributed by the competition-based method. Third,
grants can be categorized as matching or non-matching. If the amount of grant changes
when a recipient government changes taxes or expenditures, the grant is called a matching
grant. Otherwise, the grant is referred to as a lump-sum or non-matching grant (R.C. Fisher,
2007, p. 204). ARRA grants were structured as one-time aid; recipients’ requirement to
match spending was waived, so these were lump-sum grants. Lastly, matching grants can
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be considered closed-ended or open-ended—depending on whether a limit has been placed
on the grant amount.
Let us now examine grant impact. Economic theories have suggested that
“matching grants are more stimulative than lump-sum grants” (R.C. Fisher, 2007, p. 207).
This is due to the size of price effect, which is caused by matching grants. The size of price
effect is greater than the one of income effect that lump-sum grants generate. If ARRA
grants had been designed to be matching grants, state spending might have been much
greater than the real effects. However, given the severe and urgent situation produced by
the Great Recession, a prompt counter-cyclical fiscal policy was needed, so perhaps lumpsum grants were indeed the most appropriate grant-type for the ARRA program.
Figure 3 presents the effect of lump-sum grants that has a specific purpose of
spending. Let’s assume that a recipient government currently consumes X at 𝑥𝑥0 under

the initial budget line (AB). If the recipient government receives intergovernmental grants

(G), it shifts the initial budget line (AB) to ACD 21. Albeit granters expect recipients would
increase their spending on X as much as the amount of grant, there is a possibility that the
recipient decides to consume a lower level of X at 𝑥𝑥1 . 22 This is called fungibility which
means a recipient diverts the funds that would have been spent on a specific purpose to

another purpose in the overall budget, because the recipient saves the substantial amount
of the fund after being subsidized by the grant. That is, if fungibility happens, a recipient

21

If the grant does not have the restriction, the second budget line should be FD.

22

𝑥𝑥0 𝑥𝑥1 is smaller than G
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government increases the total amount of spending by less than the amount of grant that
grantors expected. The categorical lump-sum grant “does not guarantee that expenditures
on the aided category will increase by the full amount of the grant” (Fisher, 2007, p. 211).

Figure 3. Impact of lump-sum grant

The issue of fungibility represents much to the impact ARRA grants had on state
government expenditures since the Great Recession. Some studies have suggested that
federal aid has crowding-out effects (i.e., federal aid triggers declines in state spending).
For example, Knight (2002) asserted that grant awards had negative effects on state
spending—based on his two-stage least squares model analyzing the federal highway
grants. However, most studies assert a positive relationship between federal grants and
subnational government expenditure. The positive relationship is supported by the flypaper
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effect. A lump-sum grant is known that its effect on increases in expenditure is greater than
income’s effect, which is called the flypaper effect (Fisher, 2007, p. 218). According to the
economics of public finance, federal grants shift the budget line to the right, and,
consequently, the government would spend a greater quantity of money. For instance,
concerning the flypaper effect, Nesbit and Kreft (2009) analyzed the effect of a $1 increase
in the federal grant on state highway spending. After reviewing previous literature that
showed the positive effects on state expenditure, the authors presented results of their
analysis—indicating similar effects. This refutes the argument that federal grants have
crowding-out effects and indicates that flypaper effects are being produced.
The purpose of a federal grant is not to “supplant” subnational government
spending but to “supplement” it (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 2011). So,
many federal grants are accompanied by a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) provision to
induce subnational governments to spend their own money on the grant program, thereby
preventing them from spending their money on their priorities. However, the degree of
impact on government spending increase is not clear (CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, 2011), and one study suggested that federal grants have a crowding-out effect on
state government spending. Thus, the present dissertation examines if ARRA grants had
stimulative effects on state government expenditures, and if so, determines the degree of
these grant effects.
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2.3.2. Determinants of government expenditure
This section presents a literature review on determinants of recipient government
expenditures—to find implication that can be applied in the examination of grant impact
on expenditure. Factors affecting government expenditure are categorized into political,
fiscal (institutional), and external factors of government. First, in terms of political
determinants of expenditures, the literature generally states that the Republicans are more
likely to have a balanced budget (Hou & Smith, 2010), whereas Democrats tend to have
higher demands on spending (Alt & Lowry, 1994). Second, another determinant, legal
limitations [e.g., tax and expenditure limitation (TELs)], hinder governments from raising
taxes (revenues) or expenditures (Amiel, Deller, & Stallmann, 2009; Deller, Stallmann, &
Amiel, 2012; Mullins & Wallin, 2004). Third, external factors affect government
expenditure: median income from the median voter theorem (Congleton & Bennett, 1995;
Mueller, 2003, p. 244) and the unemployment rate from the business cycle hypothesis (e.g.,
Hou & Smith, 2010; McGranahan, 1999).

Political factors for expenditures
Though the administrative body participates in policy formulation, the main actors
of policy decision-making process are politicians in the representative democracy system.
Due to the properties of budgeting that reflect government policies, political factors are
essential to analyze public finance and budget issues. In addition, political variables are
needed to analyze infrastructure finance, because infrastructure investments extend across
long time periods, compared to the short time periods of politicians’ terms, which may
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cause politicians to transfer current fiscal responsibility to future generations (W. Wang,
Hou, & Duncome, 2007, p. 26). Thus, the first determinants of government expenditure are
political factors.
It is generally known that Democrats are high-demand parties on spending,
compared to Republicans. However, there is not enough evidence to support this anecdote.
Poterba (1995b) suggested that state legislatures with a Republican controlled lower-house
and a Democratic controlled upper-house (i.e., State Senate) tended to have above-average
spending; however, states with the reverse political party configuration in their legislature
tended to have below-average spending. While redistributive expenditures are
differentially affected by the respective ideologies of the U.S. political parties, it remains
unclear if developmental spending is affected by these different ideologies. Thus, we must
examine the effect of political differences on transportation investments as the
developmental policy.

Fiscal institutions for expenditure
Concerning the impact of fiscal institutions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs)
and balanced budget requirements (BBRs) have been mainly discussed in the research
literature. Most states place legal limitations on governments that hinder them from raising
taxes (revenues) or expenditures (Amiel et al., 2009; Deller et al., 2012; Mullins & Wallin,
2004). In one study, Hou and Smith (2010) reported that expenditure limitation rules had a
positive relation with fund balance, but tax limitation had a negative association with fund
balance. Amiel et al. (2009) constructed a stringency index of TELs with 28 weighted
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criteria. They proposed six groups of 28 criteria 23 (p. 6). Higher aggregated value of the
components indicates higher level of stringency of TELs. In the present study, I adopt the
stringent index of TELs as a fiscal institution variable in the quantitative analysis.
The second fiscal institution is the balanced budget requirement (hereafter BBR).
BBRs do not directly affect transportation expenditure. BBRs “usually apply to operating
budgets and not capital or pension funds. Within current expenditure, they cover general
funds and not federal funds or special funds dedicated to specific purpose such as local
governments or transportation. As a result, BBRs typically apply to less than 75 percent of
state budgets” (Gordon, 2012, p. 249). However, BBRs could affect transportation
expenditure indirectly, because transportation expenditures are allocated partially from
general funds, and budget allocations for other categories would also affect transportation.
BBRs exist in three different forms (NCSL, 2010, p. 2): (1) the budget proposal
should be submitted with a balanced budget; (2) the “enacted budget” also should be
balanced; and (3) deficit carryover is not allowed. Though most states have rules pertaining
to BBRs, specific requirements and their stringency differ across states (Mahdavi &
Westerlund, 2011; NCSL, 2010; Poterba, 1995a). Early studies used one component of the

23

[A] – [F] indicates the five groups of 28 criteria, and the numbers in parentheses means a weighting
of each criterion. [A] Restriction on Revenue and expenditure (6), Revenue (5), Expenditure (4),
Appropriations (3), Tax revenue (2), General fund expenditure (1); [B] Statutory (0) or constitutional
(1); [C] Growth restriction: Less than or equal to inflation and/or population growth (7), Less than or
equal to the rate of personal income (6), Limited to growth in the state economy (5), Less than 7% of
state income (4), Greater than 7% of state income (3), Equal to a share of total revenue or expenditures
(2), New or increased taxes and fees (1); [D] Method of approval: Constitutional convention (4),
Legislative referendum (3), Citizen initiative (2), Legislative vote (1); [E] Override provisions: No
override allowed (4), Voter approval to raise taxes and expenditure of surplus revenues (3),
Supermajority vote (2), Declaration of emergency and/or supermajority vote to use emergency funds
(1); and [F] Exemptions: Budget reserves (-1), Grants (-1), Capital projects (-1), Debt service (-1),
Court mandates (-1), Non-recurring general fund appropriations (-1)
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three BBRs or valued each component and aggregated the components. The deficit
carryover rule that prohibits governments from transferring budget deficits into the next
fiscal year affects state revenues and expenditures (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994).
ACIR (1987) presented the fiscal stringency index that was measured by four components:
the submission of a balanced budget, the passing of a balanced budget by the legislature,
three levels of deficit carryover rules, and whether each rule is defined by the constitution
or by statutory processes. Hou and Smith (2006) developed the BBR index, claiming that
indices in prior studies were measured in ways that “at least partially reflect personal
perception, judicial interpretation, and other nonstatutory and nonconstitutional
considerations” (p. 27). They suggested nine components of BBRs—categorized by type
of rule (technical and political) and phase of the budget cycle. They utilized the index in
another study (Hou & Smith, 2010), and found each BBR’s statistically significant effect
on fund balances. Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011) tested if BBRs are associated with fiscal
sustainability indicators that were measured as fund balances 24. They adopted the BBR
classification of Hou and Smith (2006) and applied four BBRs from the categorization,
BBR2, BBR5, BBR7, and BBR9, with the ACIR fiscal stringency indicator’s accumulated
value. Using bootstrap p-values, they concluded that BBRs are positively related to a fiscal
sustainability indicator, general revenues less current expenditures.
In the present study, I adopt the TELs fiscal stringency index from Amiel et al.
(2009) and the BBRs rules surveyed by NCSL (2010).

24
“B1. Total revenues less total expenditures, B2. General revenues less general expenditures, B3.
General revenues less current expenditures, and B4. Own-source general revenues less current general
direct expenditures” (Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011, p. 959)
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External factors for expenditures: Median voters and Business cycle
The median voter theorem and business cycle model are typical public choice
theories that stress economic theoretical methods to explain public policy decision making.
First, according to the median voter theorem, median voters are regarded as the decisive
group that affects decision making for governmental policy in the majority-voting system
of democracy. The median voter is more decisive in determining “the majority-voting
equilibrium 25” in an inequality society in which mean income exceeds median income,
compared to an equality society which has similar levels of mean and median income such
as asymmetric valuation distribution (Hillman, 2009, pp. 415-416). Gramlich and
Rubinfeld (1982) found that higher-income individuals did not appear to have greater
preference for public spending than lower income individuals, indicating that the median
income group more effectively influences public policy than the higher income group. Thus,
the median voter theorem implies that median income voters are likely to determine the
demand for public goods rather than mean income people (Mueller, 2003, p. 244).
Congleton and Bennett (1995) studied whether state highway expenditures were impacted
by special interest groups and median voters, finding that the latter—a proxy of median
voters’ preferences—positively affected expenditures per mile, which they used as a
dependent variable indicating state efforts to maintain and improve roads. However,
Walden and Eryuruk (2012) yielded different results in an investigation of North Carolina’s
state highway investments in 100 counties using the median voter model, the special

25

In a democratic political system by popular sovereignty, a majority-voting equilibrium, “there is not
majority support in favor of change, particularly in favor of reducing supply” (Hillman, 2009, p. 415).
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interest group model, the political model, and the combined model. The study distinguished
the investment into construction expenditures and maintenance spending, and adopted
lagged value of expenditure to estimate policy lags over time. According to their result,
median income change was positively significant only for maintenance spending in the
combined model with a two-year lag, and not significant in other models and for
construction expenditures.
Second, studies on public economics and public finance have adopted the business
cycle as a driver of expenditures. Because government budget is a subset of the whole
economy, government expenditure is affected by economic conditions. A proxy for the
business cycle can be the unemployment rate (e.g., Hou & Smith, 2010; McGranahan, 1999)
or the deviation values from the mean of gross state product (GSP) growth rate (W. Wang
et al., 2007). McGranahan (1999) established five types of classified state expenditures:
“current spending, capital spending, intergovernmental expenditures, interest on the debt,
and insurance trust expenditures,” and tested whether the business cycle, defined as
unemployment rate, affects expenditures. The findings indicate that capital is negatively
affected by the unemployment rate—additional decrease in the unemployment rate caused
capital expenditures to decrease by $6.93. Following Hou and Smith (2010) and
McGranahan (1999), the present study uses the unemployment rate as the business cycle
indicator.
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2.4. Gaps in literature
Chapter II reviewed three strands of literature. Admittedly, previous theoretical
and empirical studies contributed to expanding current knowledge of government capacity
and its influence on the public administration of subnational governments. However, gaps
in the research literature remain. The present study indicates several shortcomings in past
research, in terms of the (a) theoretical backgrounds used to explain the impact of
government capacity on governmental performance and (b) conceptualization and
measurement of government capacity.
Previous studies have mentioned government capacity (GC) and suggested that
GC is involved in grant allocation and grant (or policy) implementation (Krause, Feiock,
& Hawkins, 2016; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015;
Terman & Feiock, 2015). However, these studies did not adduce an organized theoretical
framework for the link between GC and performance. For example, Manna and Ryan (2011)
did not provide any theoretical background in their explanation of the association between
GC and grant competition; they merely cited results from some empirical studies.
Moreover, Krause et al. (2016) and Terman and Feiock (2015) utilized GC as an
independent variable affecting policy implementation, but did not establish their own
theoretical framework accounting for the relation.
Most prior studies conceptualized and operationalized GC using authors’ intuition
or citing another research (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Manna & Ryan, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty
& Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Nicholson-Crotty & Staley, 2012; Terman & Feiock, 2014).
Those researchers simply assigned meaning to the concept of GC based on their practical
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experience and intuition. For instance, Carley et al. (2015) suggested the definition of
capacity as “relevant policy experience” and “implementation capacity,” and measured it
using “the existence and character of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) policy” and “the
financial management capacity measure developed by the Government Performance
Project (GPP),” respectively. However, they did not provide any theory supporting the
measurement. Collins and Gerber (2006), which is cited often in the research literature,
adopted the number of government employees per resident as a proxy for GC, but also did
not provide a theory to support the operationalization.
Referring to the pros and cons of prior literature, this dissertation proposes
theoretical backgrounds, then establishes the theoretical framework, in the next chapter. In
the present study, the three stages of ARRA grants (acquisition, implementation, and
impact) are regarded as performance of GC. Thus, the theoretical approach of the
dissertation begins with general theories pertaining to the achievement of goals, and then
proposes more specific frameworks for the link between GC and performance and for the
measurement of GC.
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Chapter III. THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Chapter III describes the theoretical framework for the link between government capacity
(GC) and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) grants, and
describes the concept of GC. The chapter introduces the framework explaining relations
between GC and ARRA grant acquisition, implementation, and expenditure recovery. The
chapter also reviews theories pertaining to GC and presents the concept and measurement
of GC.

3.1. Theoretical framework
This section proposes the theoretical framework of the present study. I begin by
presenting two background theories: Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT).
Systems theory provides the background logic that is utilized to explain how government
capacity (GC) affects ARRA grants. RBT concerns how GC can be measured and why GC
is significant for ARRA grants.

3.1.1. Brief review of Systems theory
Systems theory is “an approach to organizations that focuses on how they translate
inputs into outputs” (Kettl, 2011). Historically, system thinking existed before in the form
of a theory to explain organizations. However, subsequent to the research of von
Bertalanffy, scholars have utilized General Systems Theory (GST), which can be applied
to all general science fields (T.-W. Wang, 2004, p. 394)
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Systems theory is divided into two approaches: closed system and open system.
The former views an organization as a machine that is not affected by environment. This
approach focuses on “the internal workings of the system” (Kettl, 2011). So, it referred to
as mechanistic or nonliving systems approach. The open system approach assumes that an
organization is open to the environment. As organic or living systems, organizations react
to the impact of the environment and interact with each other.
However, the modern organization theory is more in tune with the open systems
theory (Kettl, 2011; Miller, 1965; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Schroeder, 1994; T.-W. Wang, 2004).
As an open system organization, a government: receives “inputs of resources” (e.g.,
equipment and the energies or labor of employees), conducts transformational processes in
the throughputs phase, and then produces outputs (public services). Even after outputs, the
open-system functions as a feedback loop, which is a learning process for a government
(organization) to reflect a positive or negative experience to the new recurring process.
(Kettl, 2011). By cycling through the phases of the system, a government becomes a more
effective and efficient organization.
For any organization, the most important thing is self-preservation. To do so,
systems theory focuses on the purpose of government (organization) and seeks the best
way to achieve that purpose—via the process of translating inputs into outputs. Two
abilities are critical to an organization’s successful processes and viability: (1) “capacity to
manipulate or adapt to its external environment” and (2) “capacity to suppress or moderate
internal threats” (Kettl, 2011, pp. 102-104). That is, the systems theory implies that as an
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open-system, a government (organization) must continue to enhance its capacity, monitor
environmental changes, and adapt to make the best use of the changes.

3.1.2. Resource Based Theory
Government capacity (GC) is closely related to resources. Resources significantly
affect strategies to build capacity; resources are a characteristic of higher capacity
organizations. Public administration researchers have acknowledged the emerging
importance of resources by citing Resource Based Theory in recent studies (Bryson,
Ackermann, & Eden, 2007; Lee & Whitford, 2012).
Resource Based Theory (RBT) or Resource Based View (RBV) emerged when
Wernerfelt (1984) proposed the concept, which contends that a firm’s performance is
dependent on its resources. Before the RBT, the dominant paradigm in industrial
organization economics was the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which
contends that performance is impacted by a firm’s market power in the industry structure
(J. B. Barney & Clark, 2007). According to RBT, organizations that outperform others have
a different portfolio of idiosyncratic resources (J. B. Barney & Clark, 2007; J. B. Barney,
Ketchen, & Wright, 2011; Lee & Whitford, 2012). RBT had been previously discussed
mainly in the areas of business administration and economics; however, several scholars
in public administration have accepted and utilized the theory (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo,
2009; Graddy & Chen, 2006; Haughton, 1999; Lee & Whitford, 2012; Pitts, 2005; Yang,
Hsieh, & Li, 2009). In the present study, instead of performing an in-depth investigation
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into the theory itself, I explore characteristics of RBT and apply them to frame the concept
of government capacity.
Recognizing that resources are essential to the performance of a firm (or
organization), we must first define the concept of resource. J. B. Barney and Clark (2007)
proposed four attributes that a firm’s resource should have:
(a) it must be valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or
neutralize threats in a firm’s environment, (b) it must be rare among a firm’s
current and potential competition, (c) it must be imperfectly imitable, and (d) it
must be able to be exploited by a firm’s organizational process (p. 57).
Resources can be characterized using the VRIO framework, which stands for
questions of Value, Rareness, Imitability, and Organization. First, valuable resources are
assessed by whether or not a firm overcomes external threats and responds to opportunities
by using the resources. By utilizing SWOT (Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities, and
Threats) analysis, valuable resources can be examined. Second, resources that are
accessible to competitors cannot be exploited to outperform such competitors; when
resources are controlled by a small number of firms, these resources can be used for
survival and to be competitive. Third, if a resource is difficult to imitate (i.e., imperfectly
imitable), a firm has a competitive advantage over others, which requires one or all of
historical uniqueness, causal ambiguity, and social complexity. 26 Lastly, even if the three

26

“Firm resources can be imperfectly imitable (or costly to imitate) for one or a combination of three
reasons: (a) the ability of a firm to obtain a resource is dependent on unique historical conditions, (b)
the link between the resources possessed by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is
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abovementioned conditions are satisfied, a firm should be sufficiently organized to support
the resources that have the three attributes (Barney & Clark, 2007, pp. 57-70).
We will now review examples of resources. The public administration literature
(Bryson et al., 2007; Lee & Whitford, 2012) views the concept of resources as a broad term
that refers to the various types of assets that an administration body can exploit to achieve
performance and organizational goals. In support of this perspective, J. Barney (1991)
stated, “resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes,
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (p. 101). In addition,
intangible and tangible assets are regarded as resources—provided that the assets are
utilized “to develop and implement strategies” (Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004, p. 24). In
an empirical study that accounted for RBT, Lee and Whitford (2012) proposed six
organizational resources that predicted performance: “administrative (structural) resources,
human resources, financial resources, physical resources, political resources, and
reputation resources” (p. 690). They operationalized: administrative (structural) resources
as the number of members in the top governing structure (Senior Executive Service);
human resources as the level of professionalization of its employees; financial resources as
spending authority from offsetting collections; and political resources as presidential
attention and the agency’s public reputation. These factors positively affect organizational
performance, which implies that RBT is meaningful in predicting performance.

causally ambiguous, or (c) the resource generating a firm’s advantage is socially complex” (Barney &
Clark, 2007).
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3.1.3. Frame for government capacity and ARRA grant
Borrowing from Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT), the present
study establishes a theoretical framework that links government capacity and ARRA grants.
First, the implication of Systems theory is that output is a result of the process of input and
throughput. That is, the performance (output) of government depends on how well the
phases of input and throughput performed. In addition, because government is an opensystem organization, the adaptability and manipulability of the external environment are
also significant; the input and throughput phases must secure abilities (capacities). Second,
RBT implies that good resources are the key factors for a government to outperform other
governments. RBT also provides a background to identify the factors that are considered
to be components of GC. An empirical study (Lee & Whitford, 2012) supported the
rationale of RBT by considering several resources to be components of capacity (e.g.,
administrative, human, and financial resources).
Building on Systems Theory and RBT, the present study proposes a framework for
the relationship between GC and ARRA grants. Figure 4 presents an open-system, in which
output (grant acquisition, grant implementation, and grant impact) depends on
input/throughput (state needs, government capacity, state politics, fiscal institution,
legislative control, and federal politics). According to the type of output, the set of input
and throughput differs. For example, the framework assumes federal politics affect only
grant acquisition, whereas state needs affect all outputs.
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Among the factors of input and throughput, government can only control or
manage government capacity. Thus, the present study focuses on government capacity as
the key independent variable that affects all grant outputs.

Figure 4 Schematic Model

3.2. Conceptualization and measurement of Government Capacity
This section reviews theory development for the concept of government capacity
(GC) and suggests a measurement of GC. I present a review of previous literature on this
topic, and review the concept of GC and examples of how to measure management capacity
and financial capacity. Then, I describe the concept and framework of GC used in the
present study and propose an operationalization of GC for the empirical analysis of ARRA
grants.
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3.2.1. Literature review of Government Capacity (Capability)
Public administration scholars have examined the concept of GC; however, no
consensus has been reached on how to define or measure it. The present study explores the
concept and the measurement of GC and endeavors to find alternative uses for it. The
concept of capacity, in the context of different research studies, is reviewed to compare
how the various studies defined and utilized capacity. Then, I introduce empirical studies
on GC that investigate management capacity and fiscal capacity.

Concept of government capacity in literature
The dictionary definition 27 of capacity is “the ability or power to do, experience,
or understand something,” “the maximum amount that something can contain,” or “amount
that something can produce.” A related term, capability, is defined in the dictionary 28 as
“power or ability,” “the extent of someone’s or something’s ability,” or “forces or resources
giving a country or state the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action.” The
common ground between the dictionary definitions of capacity and capability is “ability.”
While capability focuses on “ability” or “resources,” capacity additionally encompasses
the meaning of volume to contain something. With respect to “ability,” the two concepts
have the same dictionary meaning. Academic studies rarely distinguish between the two
terms. Most studies in the field of public administration or political science, account for

27

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/capacity

28

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/capability
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capacity and capability as the power or the ability of government, and regard them as
having interchangeable meanings (Bowman & Kearney, 1988, p. 341).
The first mention and conceptualization of government capacity (GC) occurred in
several pioneering studies (e.g., Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Donahue et al., 2000; Gargan,
1981; Honadle, 1981). Honadle (1981, p.577) defined capacity as "the ability to anticipate
and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs
to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and evaluate current
activities to guide future actions." Ingraham and Donahue (2000, p. 294) stated that
management capacity indicates “government’s intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, direct,
and control its human, physical, and information capital to support the discharge of its
policy directions.” Similarly, Donahue et al. (2000, p. 384) described management capacity
as a “government's ability to develop, direct, and control its resources to support the
discharge of its policy and program responsibilities.” The World Bank (1997, p. 77) refers
to state capability as “the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least cost to
society. This notion of capability encompasses the administrative or technical capacity of
state officials and of supporting systems and processes, but is much broader than that. It
also includes the deeper institutional mechanisms that give politicians and civil servants
the flexibility, rules and restraints to enable them to act in the collective interest.” Although
Bowman and Kearney (1988, p. 343) did not directly delineate the concept of capacity,
their study highlighted the abilities of responsiveness, efficient and effective decision
making, and conflict management. They argued that management capacity would be
strengthened by developing “program, policy, and resource management skills for
utilization in federally funded endeavors” (p. 342).
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Second movers adopted the early studies’ conceptualization of capacity and
expanded or applied it according to their research focuses. Van Slyke (2003) explained
public-management capacity as “personnel, oversight and program audit capabilities, and
the necessary communication and political skills” (p. 296). Specifically, for management
capacity, personnel must possess “contract-management experience, policy expertise,
negotiation, bargaining, and mediation skills” (p. 296). Meanwhile, Hou et al. (2003)
classified government capacity as “the administrative capacity approach” and “the
governance capability approach.” The former refers to aspects of the administration that
considers “the importance of policies, procedures, and resources governing administrative
action” (p. 300). The latter approach encompasses external aspects of the administration
(e.g., political influences); the authors regarded capability as the rules or equilibrium that
are created and restricted by political choice, an institution, and the rule of law—adopting
the perspective of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Topinka (2011) explained that the
meaning of capacity is simply “power” and that management capacity can be described
using the traditional view of administrative management: POSDCoRB (Planning,
Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting and Budgeting). He accepted the
model of GPP (Government Performance Project) and explained that the model integrates
the seven management criteria of POSDCoRB. Selden and Sowa (2004) viewed
“management capacity as the degree to which the necessary systems and processes are in
place to maintain an organization” (p. 404). Table 3 summarizes GC concepts that prior
studies defined.
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Table 3 Concept of Capacity
Authors
Honadle's (1981)

Concept of Government Capacity
"the ability to anticipate and influence change; make informed,
intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs to implement
policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and
evaluate current activities to guide future actions."

Ingraham and
Donahue (2000)

Management Capacity is “government’s intrinsic ability to
marshal, develop, direct, and control its human, physical, and
information capital to support the discharge of its policy
directions.”

World Bank (1997)

“the ability of the state to undertake collective actions at least cost
to society.
Capability of state government means “(1) to respond effectively
to change; (2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively (i.e.,
rationally) and responsively; and (3) to manage conflict.”
public-management capacity as “personnel, oversight and
program audit capabilities, and the necessary communication and
political skills”
“the importance of policies, procedures, and resources governing
administrative action”
“power”
“the degree to which the necessary systems and processes are in
place to maintain an organization”

Bowman & Kearney
(1988)
Van Slyke (2003)

Hou, Moynihan, and
Ingraham (2003)
Topinka (2011)
Selden and Sowa
(2004)

Management Capacity: measurement in empirical studies
Most empirical studies have not developed their own concept of “capacity.” The
research literature asserts that the concept of government capacity “does not exist on its
own” but rather exists “in relation to its application” (Terman & Feiock, 2014, p. 6). Thus,
many studies have presented their measurement methods without a thorough discussion on
the definition of government capacity. Carley et al. (2015) explained capacity in terms of
relevant technical skills, relevant organizational experiences, adequate resources, cognitive
skills, and human capital (p. 116). They measured government capacity with two variables:
policy experience and financial management. Policy experience was measured by the
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number of years that a state’s renewable portfolio standards was determined for electricity
policy; they employed “financial management scores” of the Government Performance
Project (GPP) to measure financial management. To measure the concept of administrative
capacity, Terman and Feiock (2014) used five components: overall capacity, managerial
capacity, dedicated sustainability staffing, lack of staff capacity, and lack of information
resources. 29 Terman and Feiock (2015) (a) measured “administrative capacity” using the
number of financial management employees; (b) “policy capacity” was quantified as a
dummy variable in which a city was coded as “1” if the city had at least one member for
sustainability programs; and (c) “management structure” was coded as “1” if a municipality
was managed using a council-manager system (p. 333). To measure capacity, Manna and
Ryan (2011) used the acquisition of a planning grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation; the study also logged population density. The authors assumed that the grantaward indicates that a state has greater ability to implement policies, because the state’s
capacity was boosted by the grant, compared to a state that failed to obtain the grant. In
addition, population density was utilized due to the assumption that an urban state has
greater ability to apply for and implement programs—compared to a rural state. Table 4

29

(1) The overall capacity was measured with “Number of financial management staff members in a
municipal government per 1000 residents,” and (2) the managerial capacity’s proxy was “Council
manager form of government with appointed city manager.” The other three components were
measured by the survey. (3) The dedicated sustainability staffing was measured by “Which scenario
best describes staffing sustainability activities in your city? (Check the response that best applies;
choices include no dedicated staffing for sustainability, dedicated staff based in city manager/CEO
office or equivalent, dedicated staff based in the mayor or city council office, and dedicated staff based
in one or more departments).” (4) The lack of staff capacity was asked as “[In relation to EECBG
projects] on a scale from 1 = “not an obstacle” to 5 = “substantial obstacle”; please rate how [lack of
staff capacity] influences your city’s ability to reduce its overall energy consumption.” (5) The lack of
information resources was measured by “[In relation to EECBG projects] on a scale from 1 = “not an
obstacle” to 5 = “substantial obstacle”; please rate how [lack of informational resources] influences
your city’s ability to reduce its overall energy consumption.” (pp. 12-13)
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summarizes components of management capacity and measurements that previous
literature discussed.

Table 4 Definitions and Measurements of Government Capacity
Studies
Carley et al.
(2015)

Components of capacity
Relevant technical skills,
relevant organizational
experiences, adequate
resources, cognitive skills,
and human capital

Bowman and
Kearney (1988)

Responsiveness, efficient
and effective decision
making, and conflict
management
Ability to compete for and to
manage grant contracts

Collins and
Gerber (2008)

Jennings, Hall,
and Zhang
(2012)

Terman and
Feiock (2015)

Terman and
Feiock (2014)

Manna and Ryan
(2011)

Human, physical, and
information capital to
support the discharge of its
policy directions (accepting
the definition of Ingraham
and Donahue)
(1) Administrative capacity,
(2) Policy capacity,
(3) Management structure

(1) Overall capacity,
(2) Managerial capacity,
(3) Dedicated sustainability
staffing,
(4) lack of staff capacity,
(5) lack information
resource
Administrative talents and
resources
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Measurement
Government relevant experience (the
number of years of a state’s
renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
for the electricity policy),
financial management capacity
(financial management scores of
GPP)
Factor analysis from 32 variables

The number
of financial administrators and other
government administrators for every
1,000 county residents
GPP scores of four dimensions
(human resources, financial
management, infrastructure,
information)

(1) The number of financial
management employees,
(2) dummy, if the city had a member
for sustainability programs (1/0),
(3) Council-manager form
(1) Number of financial management
staff members per 1000 residents,
(2) Council-manager form,
(3~5) from survey questions

The acquirement of a Gate grant and
the logged population density

Fiscal Capacity: concept and measurement
While government capacity mainly concerns management capacity, a subordinate
concept to GC concerns fiscal policy. It is called fiscal capacity, but is also referred to as
“tax capacity” because major revenues come from taxes. Most studies have discussed fiscal
capacity mainly in terms of ability to raise revenue (Akin, 1973; Compson, 2003; Dincecco
& Prado, 2012; Fox, 1977; Kincaid, 1989; Ladd, 1975; Lucke, 1984). The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR, 1962, p. 3) defined fiscal capacity as
“the resources which a taxing jurisdiction can tax to raise revenue for public purposes.”
Because the aspect focuses on how much governments can secure revenue through taxes,
some scholars prefer the term tax capacity over fiscal capacity (W. D. Berry & Fording,
1997; Lucke, 1984; Tannenwald & Cowan, 1997). Tax capacity is defined by ACIR as “the
capability of a governmental entity to finance its public services" (W. D. Berry & Fording,
1997, p. 158). Table 5 summarizes prior studies regarding the concept of fiscal capacity.

Table 5 Concept of fiscal capacity
Authors
Fox (1977)
Lucke (1984)
Compson (2003)
Dincecco & Prado
(2012)
Kincaid (1989)
Berry & Fording
(1997)
ACIR (1962)

Concept of Fiscal Capacity
“the ability of governments to obtain resources for public purposes”
“the ability of a government to raise revenue”
“a state's ability to raise revenues from its own sources”
“the ability of states to raise tax revenues”
“the ability to raise own source revenues to meet expenditure choices”
state tax capacity is “the amount of revenue the state would collect”
“Fiscal capacity is a quantitative measure intended to reflect the
resources which a taxing jurisdiction can tax to raise revenue for
public purposes.”
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Three types of measurement methods for fiscal capacity are used by scholars who
regard the concept as tax capacity. Per capita state personal income—measured by dividing
personal income by the number of residents—was the first method used to measure fiscal
capacity (Akin, 1973; Compson, 2003; Fox, 1977; Ladd, 1975; Lucke, 1984). However,
this approach has an inherent weakness because it cannot account for all of a state’s
resources. Moreover, some states do not directly collect income tax, and even though states
rely “primarily on the individual income tax for revenue, states make only limited use of
that tax” (Lucke, 1984, p. 333).
The second method used to measure fiscal capacity concerns the representative tax
system (RTS) 30. In fact, RTS does not directly measure fiscal capacity but does compare
states by creating a fiscal capacity index. The term “representative” indicates average or
typical. Construction of the index comprises three steps (Kincaid, 1989, p. 11). First, tax
capacity is calculated by “adding up the hypothetical yields” from all tax-bases, the 26
bases across eight categories: (1) total property, (2) general sales and gross receipts, (3)
personal income, (4) corporation income, (5) selective sales, (6) licenses, (7) severance,
and (8) estate and gift taxes (pp.10-11). Second, tax capacity is divided by the population
of each state. Third, the index, for comparative purposes, is calculated by dividing the per
capita tax capacity by the U.S. average per capita tax capacity. Converting it into a
percentage, the value of the index is distributed up to one hundred (p.11). The attribute of
the measurement using “average” enables comparison of a specific policy or a tax across

30

Similarly, the representative revenue system (RRS) concludes other revenue sources, such as user
fees, as well as taxes (Kincaid, 1989; Tannenwald & Cowan, 1997).
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states. However, this characteristic creates a weakness in the index: the method cannot be
used to compare states across time.
The third method used to measure fiscal capacity concerns total taxable resources
(TTR). The TTR approach was modified at the suggestion of Compson (2003) and is
currently used by the U.S. Department of Treasury, which reports TTR yearly. According
to Mikesell (2007), TTR is calculated by (1) gross state product (GSP) (2) less non-taxable
resources, and (3) income resources that are not counted in GSP. 31 The non-taxable
resources include “federal indirect business taxes, social insurance contributions, and
federal civilian enterprise surpluses” (p. 537). The income resources encompass “dividends
and interest earned from out-of-state, certain transfers from the federal government, net
realized capital gains, and earnings of residents who live out of state” (p. 537). Compared
to RTS, TTR has pros and cons as a measurement of fiscal capacity. With TTR, we can
compare states over long-term periods; it is possible to compare each state’s patterns over
time and all states across time. However, TTR is less useful than RTS in the comparison of
a specific tax or a policy in terms of tax capacity (p.537).
Related to tax capacity, the term tax effort is defined as “the extent to which it
utilizes its tax capacity” by ACIR (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 158), which refers to
“how heavily a state utilizes its tax bases” (Kincaid, 1989, p. 11). Tax effort is measured

31

TTR equals “the unduplicated sum of the income flows produced within a state and income flows
received by its residents which a state can potentially tax.” (Compson 2003, p.59)
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by the ratio of tax collections to tax capacity32 (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p. 160;
Kincaid, 1989). Thus, states can have higher fiscal capacity with lower tax effort, or lower
fiscal capacity with higher tax effort. For instance, Kincaid (1989) and Mikesell (2007)
presented an examination in which the relation between state fiscal capacity and state tax
effort has negative correlations.
The other approach to fiscal capacity focuses on the portion of government
revenue dedicated to spending. When evaluating the fiscal policy of a government, it is
critical to consider how to secure revenue and how to utilize the revenue.

Following that

rationale, higher fiscal capacity would indicate a government’s potential ability to procure
revenue, and higher fiscal capacity helps governments develop public services. Mikesell
(2007, p. 545) asserted that “states with higher fiscal capacity have greater budgetary
possibilities than do those with lower capacity.”
Hou and Moynihan (2008) used the concept of countercyclical fiscal capacity
(CCFC) and asserted that fiscal capacity “also includes the ability to allocate financial
resources to deal with future events (p.141).” CCFC is regarded as “the fiscal [tool] to
minimize disruption from revenue shocks (p.142).” The authors explained that the
countercyclical fiscal capacity “depends a great deal on predictable rules that direct and
frequently constrain the behavior of public officials” (p.141). They measured CCFC by
using the following rules: budget stabilization fund (BSF) and the general fund balance
(GFB). According to the authors, fiscal capacity is very important to a government facing

32
“ACIR then defines a state's tax capacity as the amount of revenue the state would collect if it applied
this set of national-average tax rates to each of its own tax bases (W. D. Berry & Fording, 1997, p.
160).”
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challenges such as economic downturn and revenue shock, because the capacity can help
a government mitigate the shock and cope with the economic emergency. The authors
insisted that governments with CCFC (BSF and GFB) would “be better able to have highperforming public services and prosperous economies even as they deal with recessions
than governments where such tools are absent” (p.142).
Borge (2008) explained the relationship between fiscal capacity and government
efficiency, asserting that fiscal capacity could lower efficiency. In support of their position,
they argued that governments with higher fiscal capacity are likely to have “good service
standards even if they are not fully efficient (p.483).” If so, there may be neither a strict
check from politicians nor political controversy. Moreover, they argued that higher fiscal
capacity entails “larger operating surpluses and less fiscal stress,” which does not require
a hard restriction on budgeting (p. 483). Borge used government revenue as a proxy of
fiscal capacity. 33
Y. Wang and Zhao (2014) used the concept of fiscal capacity to explain
government behavior to Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The authors asserted that
preference of PPP depends on the financial pressure of a government. So, higher fiscal
capacity was anticipated to have a negative sign to the PPP preference. Per capita annual
state revenue was used to account for fiscal capacity.

33

“Since the local taxes are of the revenue-sharing type, the revenue measure can be interpreted as an
indicator of fiscal capacity. Differences in fiscal capacity reflect differences in tax bases and the design
of the grant system.” (Borge, 2008, p. 479)

55

Zhao and Guo (2010) utilized fiscal capacity to explain higher bond ratings. They
followed a rationale in which a government with higher fiscal capacity would be “more
capable of making debt payments on time (p.567)” and have positive impacts on their bond
rating. However, in their empirical examination, fiscal capacity measured by per capita
general fund revenue had negative effects on GO bond rating, and the authors presented an
alternative interpretation of the result—stating per capita general fund revenues “reflect
not only fiscal capacity but also fiscal burden (p. 574)”.
In sum, the research literature on fiscal capacity was reviewed using two aspects:
securing and utilizing revenue. Because aspects both concern revenue, any method used to
measure fiscal capacity should choose a proxy that reflects revenue. Another implication
from the review is that the measurement of fiscal capacity can vary according to the topic
of research or the purpose. Mikesell (2007) stated, “no single approach to capacity
measurement will meet all analytical expectations.” Thus, provided that the measurement
retains inherent attributes of fiscal capacity, the method of measurement can be flexible.

3.2.2. Concept and framework for government capacity
Following the previous review of theories on government capacity and Resource
Based Theory (RBT), I now present two arguments. First, as Honadle (1981) mentioned,
"it is unlikely that a consensus definition of 'capacity' will ever be reached" (p. 575); it is
difficult to narrowly define the concept of capacity into a single aspect. Instead, it is
appropriate to define the concept in relation to its application in a research case. Based on
the literature review of government capacity, three implications were found: (1) capacity
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means ability; (2) capacity is related to resources; and (3) capacity reflects systems. Thus,
the present study comprehensively defines capacity as: the ability of government to make
its performance by utilizing resources and by managing systems.
Second, to measure the defined concept of GC, specified components of GC are
required. The present study refers to RBT for the appropriate components. RBT implies
that resources are the key success factors for a government (organization) to achieve goals.
Which resource is appropriate depends on the process of government policy and the nature
of the resource. Systems theory divides the policy process into four phases: input,
throughput, output/outcome, and feedback. Because governments can control resources
only in the input-throughput phases, resources in these phases have greater importance.
Moreover, resources can be classified as tangible (e.g., human resources) and intangible
assets (e.g., reputation and knowledge/skills). Donahue et al. (2000) stated, “capacities are
key components of the black box of public administration; they comprise a set of
intervening variables in the equation that relates public production inputs and policy and
program performance” (p. 382). The present study also assumes that output and outcome
is determined by a combination of capacities. Tangible resources are given or supplemented
physically, but intangible capacity is learned in the feedback process from success or failure
in output and outcome.
Figure 5 depicts the framework for the concept of government capacity—based on
systems theory and resource-based theory. First, in the policy process, governments can
control their own resources only in the input and throughput phases. So, government
capacity should be defined and measured by the resources in the phases. Prior studies
57

(Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Honadle, 1981) support the approach, which argues that
capacity building is considered with “a series of inputs.” Admittedly, resources or inputs
do not necessarily assure great performance; however, they, as indicators of capacity, are
good tools for anticipating output and outcome and for comparing states (Bowman 1988,
p. 343). Second, even in the input/throughput phases, resources are categorized into
tangible and intangible. In reality, both tangible and intangible resources work together “to
enable the execution of a particular business [administrative] process” (Ray et al., 2004, p.
26).

Policy process (systems theory)

Resources
(Resource
based
theory)

Input/Throughput

Output/Outcome

Tangible

Human resource capacity,
Financial resource capacity

Grant Acquisition,

Intangible

General management capacity,
Previous Experience capacity

Grant Implementation,
Grant impact

Figure 5. Framework for government capacity

Following the framework of capacity, the present study proposes two groups
(tangible and intangible) and four components (human resource, financial resource,
general management, and previous experience) of government capacity. The first tangible
resource capacity is the ability of human resource (capital), which is fundamental to the
management and operation of the government. The second tangible resource capacity,
financial resource capacity, indicates revenue as the ability (fiscal policy) of governments
to disburse. Intangible resource capacities reflect governments’ ability to perform a policy,
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which encompass general management capacity and previous experience capacity. The two
tangible resources are related to the input phase, and intangible resources indicates the
throughput phase.

3.2.3. Measurement of government capacity in the study
In addition to the framework for the concept of government capacity, it is also
important to set specific measurements of the components of GC. This section proposes
specific proxies of each component of GC—including references to prior literature.
In this regard, empirical studies pertaining to government capacity (GC) have two
implications. First, most empirical studies are not determined to specify a precise definition
of government capacity; these studies flexibly apply GC to different measurements. Second,
the meaning of GC can vary according to each situation and policy area. Thus, the present
study focuses on finding appropriate components of government capacity regarding the
measurement of GC of state departments of transportation (DOTs).
Most studies on government capacity present human resource (HR) capacity as a
key component of GC. One aspect of HR capacity is the size of the human resource. The
present study measures it by the number of DOT employees per 1000 residents, following
the research literature (Collins & Gerber, 2008; Terman & Feiock, 2015).
As an additional aspect of HR capacity, I propose the quality of human resources.
Admittedly, it is difficult to measure quality of human resource using a quantitative proxy;
a qualitative study might be more appropriate for this task. However, as the best alternative
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method to capture the degree of the quality for a quantitative analysis, the present study
utilizes the level of payroll compared to the level of median income in a state. According
to the efficiency wage theory34, a higher wage than the opportunity cost of labor induces
workers to be devoted to their organization and increase productivity or quality. A similar
rationale is presented by the job-satisfaction theory. Wage is an important factor for job
satisfaction, and higher salary and satisfaction with salary increase organizational
performance (Selden & Sowa, 2004). Thus, the relative level of payroll can be considered
a reasonable variable to use as a proxy of quality of human resource.
The present study proposes financial resource capacity as the other tangible
government capacity. As a barometer of government capacity to perform fiscal policy,
revenue is the most important. Several studies (e.g., Borge, 2008; Y. Wang & Zhao, 2014;
Zhao & Guo, 2010) also used government revenue to measure fiscal capacity. Instead of
the “fiscal capacity” terminology, I employ “financial resource capacity.” The term fiscal
capacity may confuse readers who are familiar with tax capacity—because fiscal capacity
represents tax capacity (the size of taxable resources) as well as revenue. So, financial
resource capacity indicates resources that are used for transportation, which refers to “taxes
and charges levied on transportation-related activities and used specifically for
transportation purposes” (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2014). Thus, financial
resource capacity is measured by summation of motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle taxes, and
charges, which is standardized by the number of residents.

34

“The fundamental feature of these models is the claim that employers elicit productivity or quality
enhancing behaviors from employees by paying wages above the opportunity cost of labor (Rebitzer,
1995, p. 107).”
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Lastly, the study proposes two intangible resource capacities, which is related to
the ability of government to perform a policy. As a similar term, there is the concept of
policy capacity. I introduce several definitions of policy capacity. Painter and Pierre (2004)
defined policy capacity as the ability “to marshal the necessary resources to make
intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the allocation of scarce
resources to public ends” (p.2). Polidano (2000) also defined policy capacity as “the ability
to take decisions on the basis of a knowledgeable assessment of a comprehensive range of
information, and through a process which brings together the various agencies of
government that are involved in the area” (p.809). Howlett (2009) explained, following
Fellegi (1996), policy capacity “as a loose concept which covers the whole gamut of issues
associated with the government’s arrangements to review, formulate and implement
policies within its jurisdiction” (pp. 161-162). These definitions share common ground.
First, policy capacity requires a comprehensive ability to cover the overall process (“whole
gamut”). Second, policy capacity has the feature of intangible ability (“intelligent
collective choices” and “knowledgeable assessment”). Comprehensive intangible ability
accumulates from repeated learning and experience from the policy process. From the
concept of policy capacity, the present study proposes two intangible resource capacities:
general management capacity and previous experience. As comprehensive abilities of
government to perform transportation policy, they are learned by the repeated experience.
In terms of ARRA transportation grants, thus, intangible resource capacities are measured
by infrastructure management scores (measured by GPP) and the amount of previously
funded federal grants. In Table 6, I summarize GC components and measurement.
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Table 6 Components and measurement of GC
Variable
Human resource capacity1:
size of human resource
Human resource capacity2:
quality of human resource
Financial resource capacity
General management
capacity
Previous experience

Measurement
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT employees
/ state median income x 100
Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor vehicle
taxes, and charges)/ residents
GPP (government performance project) infrastructure
scores
Amount of federal grants

As presented above, the dissertation uses secondary data for measuring GC. The
measurement with secondary data is not enough to reflect the component of GC. If primary
data were supplemented, the operationalization would be more persuasive. I tried to make
good deficiencies for measuring GC, especially HR quality and intangible resources, by
using survey methods. However, due to the low level of response rate (30%), the survey
data were not utilized in the dissertation. I disclose the survey questionnaires and responses
in appendices.
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Chapter IV. RESEARCH QUESTION, METHOD, AND DATA
Chapter IV presents research questions, analysis method, and data for analysis—divided
into three sections, according to the three stages of an ARRA transportation grant:
acquisition, implementation, and impact. Each section explains the rationales of the three
research questions and their hypotheses, model specifications, and data with descriptions
of the variables.

4.1. Grant acquisition: Research Question, Method, and Data
4.1.1. Research question
The first research question is “Why do some states receive more ARRA grants than
others and to what extent does this depend on government capacity?” There are two main
types of grants, formula-based grants and competitive (discretionary) grants. As indicated
by their name, formula grants are allocated by a formula with pre-determined multiple
criteria (e.g., population). Unlike formula grants, competitive grants are not guaranteed and
depend on many factors, including the applicant’s ability to outperform the other candidates.
Each federal grantor establishes its own merit-based criteria for selecting appropriate
recipients, and subnational applicants do their best to develop and submit competitive
proposals. However, outcomes of the competitions vary across applicants, and the reason
for the outcomes are less understood. Focusing on competitive grant distribution, the
present study examines the distribution of competitive grants in the grant-in-aid cycle
during the Great Recession in an attempt to provide a better understanding of what makes
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some states more competitive than others, using the key independent variable: government
capacity. Thus, my research hypothesis is: Governments with higher capacity will receive
a greater amount of ARRA competitive grants.

4.1.2. Modeling grant acquisition
To test the effects of government capacity on ARRA grant acquisition, I developed
the analysis model, which explains the dependent variable as a function of government
capacity, federal politics, and state needs.
Amount of competitive grants per capita = f (government capacity, federal politics,
state needs)

The function is expressed in the mathematical form,
Grant = eα+𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 GC+𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 FP+𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 SN+ε .

It is transformed by taking the natural log on the both sides of the function, that is,
ln(Grant) = α + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 GC + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 FP + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 SN + ε,

where GC is government capacity, FP indicates federal politics, and SN means state needs.
The form of the function is called a log-linear model, because only the dependent variable
is expressed in logarithms, whereas regressors are expressed in levels. A log-linear model
can be used when a dependent variable has all positive values and when residuals of an
original regression model have a positive skewness. As Figure 6 below shows, if the
dependent variable (i.e., Grant) is used without taking the natural log, the residuals of the
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linear-linear model have a positive skewness distribution. However, in the log-linear model
for predicting effects of explanatory variables on Grant, the distribution of residuals
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Figure 6. Distributions of residuals

4.1.3. Data and variables
In order to examine whether and how the attainment of federal funds depends on
state government capacity (GC), the study constructs measurements of government
capacity (GC) and tests its effect on the amount of federal competitive grants acquired by
a state. The analysis covers all 50 U.S. states during the Great Recession (December
2007- June 2009).
As seen in Table 7, the dependent variable, ARRA grant, is set as a state
government’s amount of competitive grant awards, which is operationalized by a state’s
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sum of competitive grants awarded by the federal department of transportation. The data
source is Recovery.gov.

Table 7 Dependent variable of research question 1
Variables
Log (amount of competitive grants)

Measurement
Log (sum of DOT competitive grants under ARRA)

In terms of the relationship between government capacity and federal grants, the
research literature stresses that government capacity plays an important role in grant
competition (Collins & Gerber, 2008; Manna & Ryan, 2011). Government capacity is an
indicator of government ability to thoroughly prepare grant competition in the aspect of
grantees. Furthermore, GC is a good indicator for grantors to screen out low quality
governments that may fail to successfully implement the grant program. Thus, the present
study uses government capacity as an independent variable. As demonstrated in the prior
chapter and Table 8, GC is categorized into three variable groups: human resource capacity,
financial resource capacity, and intangible resource capacity. Human resource capacity is
measured by the size of human resource (the number of government employees) and the
quality of human resource (payrolls per employee); (2) financial resource capacity is
demonstrated by transportation revenue; and (3) intangible resource capacity is measured
by GPP infrastructure scores and the received amount of discretionary grants in 2008.
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Table 8 Government capacity measurement
Variable
Human resource capacity 1: size of
human resource
Human resource capacity 2: quality
of human resource
Financial resource capacity
General management capacity
Previous experience

Measurement
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT
employees / state median income x 100
Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor
vehicle taxes, and charges)/ residents
GPP (government performance project)
infrastructure scores
Amount of federal grants

Although grant competition is initially reviewed by the federal government, the
final decision or authorization is made by Congress. Thus, federal politics are an important
factor to explain federal fund allocation—in terms of competition between congressmen to
secure funds for their home states, according to the pork barrel hypothesis. Referring to the
research literature (e.g., Evans, 1994; Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Young & Sobel, 2013),
as described in Table 9, the present study inputs two indicators of the power of
congressional representatives from each state: the number of appropriations committee
members and the number of transportation committee members.

Table 9 Federal politics measurement
Variable
Power of congressional representatives from each state 1
Power of congressional representatives from each state 2

Measurement
Number of Appropriations
committee members
Number of Transportation
committee members

One function of a grant is to redistribute wealth (or resources) for equality across
states. The Recovery Act was also enacted to help economies recover and to support
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economically disadvantaged regions (Gimpel et al., 2012; Young & Sobel, 2013). Thus,
following previous research, the present study assumes grants are associated with state
needs, resulting in three variables: urbanization (population density), economic condition
(unemployment rate), and median voters (median income), as seen in Table 10.
Table 10 State needs measurement
Variable
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters

Measurement
Population density/100
Unemployment rate
Median income/1000

Data come from multiple sources, including Recovery.gov, USAspending.gov, the
Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed information of each variable is described in the
Table 11 below. All explanatory variables reflect values in 2008.

Table 11 Data source
Variable
ARRA
grants
Government
Capacity
(GC)

Federal
Politics
State Needs

Log (amount of competitive grants)
Human resource capacity 1: size of human
resource
Human resource capacity 2: quality of human
resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
revenue
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for grant
Power of Congressmen from each state 1
Power of Congressmen from each state 2
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters
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Source
Recovery.gov
Annual Survey of
Public Employment &
Payroll
Book of States and
Census Bureau
GPP report 2008
USAspending.gov
Congressional
directory
Census Bureau
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
Census Bureau

4.2. Grant implementation: Research Question, Method, and Data
4.2.1. Research question
The second research question is “Does government capacity affect the
implementation of ARRA grants? If so, to what extent?” The primary goal of an ARRA
grant is to spend funds as soon as possible to stimulate the economy. Though the Great
Recession ended in FY 2009, state governments had to continue reporting their progress in
fund implementation activities. According to “the DOT weekly financial and activity
report,” twenty-nine states did not complete spending the ARRA grants, and nineteen states
implemented the ARRA grants spending less than 90% of their obligations. So, the rate at
which recipient governments spent or implemented ARRA grant varied across states.
The present study investigates whether the difference in the implementation
(spending) rate depended on state government capacity. More specifically, I tested whether
and how much pacing in ARRA grant implementation was affected by government capacity.
Thus, the research hypothesis for the second research question is Governments with higher
capacity would implement a greater proportion of obligated ARRA grants than others.

4.2.2. Modeling grant implementation
To test the hypothesis, the analytical model explains variation in the
implementation rate of GC and other control variables. Specifically, the study models
implementation pace—as affected by government capacity, state politics, state needs, and
fiscal institution. The basic specification is expressed as:
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Implementation pace

= f (government capacity, state politics, state needs, fiscal institution)

The equation is composed under the assumption of linear combination, and the function is
expressed in the mathematical form,
Grant implementation rate𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α + βi 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + γi 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + δi 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + θ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ε,

where GC represents government capacity, SP indicates state politics, SN means state
needs, FI represents fiscal institutions.

4.2.3. Data and variables
The unit of analysis is the Department of Transportation in the 50 U.S. states. 35
The time range of data is 2009 to 2012. ARRA funds were initially designed to be
completely spent no later than 2011 (Carley et al., 2015, p. 114); however, as described
above, many states failed to do so by 2011 and were allowed to use the funds until 2013.
So, the present study tests the model using available data of 2009-2012.
The dependent variable is implementation pace, measured by the percentage of a
state’s outlays in the amount of obligated funds. I set the implementation pace separately
in formula grants, competitive grants, and total grants (combining the two grants). Data
were obtained from DOT weekly financial and activity reports in Recovery.gov. Table 12
presents the detailed information of variables.

35

In the real analysis, Nebraska was omitted because it does not have partisanship in the legislature.
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Table 12 Dependent variable of research question 2
Variables

Measurement

Implementation pace of formula grants

(formula grants outlays / obligations)x100

Implementation pace of competitive
grants

(competitive grants outlays / obligations)x100

Implementation pace of total grants

(total grants outlays / obligations)x100

Following prior studies (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2003; McDermott,
2006)—in which GC was essential to policy implementation and performance—I assert
that independent variables are components of GC. In terms of ARRA grants, quickly
spending grant funds is an indicator of success in grant implementation. For speedy
implementation, governments need sufficient human resources, money, and relevant
experience. Thus, the present study assumes that higher capacity governments will spend
grant funds faster than lower capacity governments. The operationalization methods for
GC are the same as in the first question’s model, as described in Table 13.

Table 13 Government capacity measurement
Variable
Human resource capacity1: size of
human resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of
human resource
Financial resource capacity
General management capacity
Previous experience

Measurement
Number of DOT employees per 1000 residents
Total amount of DOT Payrolls / number of DOT
employees / state median income x 100
Transportation revenue (motor fuel taxes, motor
vehicle taxes, and charges)/ residents
GPP (government performance project)
infrastructure scores
Amount of federal grants
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In the scholarly research, determinants of expenditure include: state needs,
political variables (Alt & Lowry, 1994; Hou & Smith, 2010), and fiscal institution (Amiel
et al., 2009; Deller et al., 2012; Mullins & Wallin, 2004). Indicators of state needs are the
same as those in the first research question’s model, as seen in Table 14. Urbanization,
economic condition, and median voters are assumed to affect government expenditure or
policies on government spending.

Table 14 State needs measurement
Variable
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters

Measurement
Population density/100
Unemployment rate
Median income/1000

Following prior research, this present study adopts political variables and fiscal
institutions as explanatory variables for grant implementation, as described in Table 15.
Political variables include each governor’s political propensity, divided government, and
party control in the legislature. They are all coded as dummy variables. Governor’s political
propensity is coded as the political party affiliation of governor; I assigned a value of 1 to
Republican governors, and zero otherwise. Divided government has a value of 1 if the
governor’s political party controls both houses in the legislature, and zero otherwise. For
party control of legislature, I coded a value of 1 when the Republican Party occupies the
majority in legislature, and zero otherwise.
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Table 15 State politics measurement
Variable
Governor’s propensity
Divided government
Party control of legislature

Measurement
Republican=1, otherwise=0
1 = governor’s party controls both houses, 0 = otherwise
Republican is majority party=1, otherwise= 0

The study uses tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) and balanced budget
requirement as proxies for fiscal institutions as described in Table 16. First, data of TELs
originate from previous research: Amiel et al. (2009). The authors developed the TEL
stringency index with six categories: “1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is statutory or
constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of TEL approval; 5) override provisions;
and 6) exemptions” (p.5). Its values were coded as an interval scale, so readers can interpret
it as State A is more stringent than State B, but cannot interpret it as State A is “many times”
stricter than State B. Maher and Deller (2012) reported that TELs positively affect fund
balance, but negatively affect own-source revenue and general fund expenditure. Second,
generally, the balanced budget requirement (BBR) is also used as a proxy for fiscal
institution in expenditure studies. However, BBR is not directly applied to capital
investment or transportation, because it is funded mostly from other funds beyond general
funds. Nevertheless, BBR is controlled in the analytic models since it influences the entire
budget allocation and could affect transportation expenditure.
Table 16 Stringency of Tax and Expenditure Limit and of Balanced Budget Requirements
Variable
Stringency of
TELs
Stringency of
BBRs

Measurement
Summation of values of TELs: 1) the type of TEL; 2) if the TEL is
statutory or constitutional; 3) growth restrictions; 4) method of TEL
approval; 5) override provisions; and 6) exemptions
Sum of BBRs (Governor Must Submit Balanced Budget, Legislature Must
Pass Balanced Budget, and Cannot Carry Over Deficit)
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The present study utilizes multiple sources for data collection, including
Recovery.gov, Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, National Conference of
State Legislatures, USAspending.gov, the Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed
information of each variable is described in Table 17 below. All explanatory variables
reflect values in 2008-2011.

Table 17 Data source
Variable
Grant
Implementation
Government
Capacity (GC)

State Needs

State Politics

Fiscal
Institution

Implementation pace of formula and
competitive grants
Human resource capacity1: size of human
resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of human
resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
revenue
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for
grant
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters
Governor’s propensity
Divided government
Party control of legislature
TELs
BBRs
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Source
Recovery.gov
Annual Survey of
Public Employment
& Payroll
Book of States and
Census Bureau
GPP report 2008
USAspending.gov
Census Bureau
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
Census Bureau
National Conference
of State Legislatures
Amiel et al. (2009)
NCSL (2010)

4.3. Grant impact: Research Question, Method, and Data
4.3.1. Research question
The research question in this chapter is “To what extent did ARRA grant aid affect
the transportation expenditure recovery and state transportation investments?” Due to the
Great Recession, state governments were confronted with diminished revenue; the severe
economic downturn included factors ranging from the collapse of the housing market to
weakened stock markets. According to the State Expenditure Report 2009 by NASBO,
during FY 2008 and FY 2009, “state revenues decreased nearly 12 percent, or by $78.5
billion” (NASBO, 2009). Consequently, there were declines in state funds (general funds
and other state funds) for expenditure. However, neither all funds nor total funds decreased.

Figure 7 Total Expenditure trend
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As seen in Figure 7, in fact, expenditures from total funds increased, in which
federal grant (e.g., ARRA) influx sharply increased in FY 2009 and FY 2010 and incited
states to continue to increase spending. However, the size of increase rate was modest
compared to the historical average annual increase rate of total state expenditures: 6.2%.
In FY 2009, total state expenditures increased by 5.4% ($1.56 trillion); in FY 2010, the
increase rate was 4% ($1.62 trillion); in FY 2011, the total amount climbed to $1.69 trillion,
4.1% (NASBO, 2010). Thus, in the severe situation caused by the Great Recession—in
which state funds declined due to economic shock—federal aid sustained states to continue
spending.

Figure 8. Transportation Expenditure trend

This dissertation focuses on transportation expenditure. As shown in Figure 8
below, states increased their transportation expenditure by 4.3% in FY 2009 and by 6.5%
76

in FY 2010. The increase of expenditure resulted from the impact of the federal fund influx.
Thus, the present study investigates the degree to which ARRA grants stimulated states to
spend funds on transportation since the Great Recession. I also check if government
capacity affects state expenditure, controlling other determinants on expenditure.

4.3.2. Modeling grant impact
To answer the third research question, I developed a research model, setting the
dependent variable as a function of ARRA grants, government capacity, state needs, and
state politics, fiscal institution, and legislature control.
Expenditure Recovery (or Expenditure)

= f (ARRA grant, government capacity, state needs, state politics,
fiscal institution, legislature control)

The study assumes that the equation is composed by linear combination, and the
function is expressed in the mathematical form,
Y𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = α + βi 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + γi 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + δi 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + θ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + τ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + ε,

where Y is expenditure recovery or expenditure, GC is government capacity, SP indicates
state politics, SN means state needs, FI represents fiscal institution, and LC is legislature
control.
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4.3.3. Data and variables
The unit of analysis is the Department of Transportation in the 50 U.S. states. 36
Data analysis covers the time range from 2009 to 2011 to investigate the impact of grants
after ARRA.
Regarding the expenditures of state governments, I adopted two dependent
variable groups. One variable is the transportation expenditure recovery. To test ARRA
funds’ effects on recovery of subnational expenditure, the study devises it. Because ARRA
was initiated in FY 2009, FY 2008 is used as the starting point to calculate the degree of
expenditure restoration. So, the difference between expenditure in FY 2008 (subtrahend)
and in each fiscal year 2009-2011 (minuend) is regarded as the amount of expenditure
restoration. This model will indicate the extent that states increased expenditure since the
last year (FY 2008) before ARRA. The other dependent variable is transportation
investment. Aside from impact on expenditure recovery, I test how expenditure is affected
by explanatory variables during the recovery period 2009-2011.
Both expenditure recovery and expenditure are categorized into total
transportation expenditure, transportation capital outlays, and transportation current
operation expenditure. The study assumes that capital outlays represent expenditures on
construction, and current expenditures reflect maintenance expenditure.

36

37

The

In the real analysis, Nebraska was omitted because it does not have partisanship in the legislature.

37

According to the definitions of State Government Finances, capital outlay means “direct expenditure
for contract or force account construction of buildings, grounds, and other improvements, and purchase
of equipment, land, and existing structures. Includes amounts for additions, replacements, and major
alterations to fixed works and structures.” Current expenditure means “Current Expenditure. All
expenditures with the exception of capital outlay. Includes Current Operations, Assistance and
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categorization of expenditures will be useful to investigate which expenditure was
effectively affected by the federal aid.
State governments must spend funds on construction in accordance with the aims
of the Recovery Act—investment (reinvestment) in transportation and infrastructure—
albeit maintenance activities are also important. So, it is meaningful to check for different
patterns across types of expenditure, regarding the effects of explanatory variables. All
amounts were standardized by population and adjusted to real value in 2012 dollars. The
specific measurements are presented below in detail (Table 18).

Table 18 Dependent variable of research question 3
Variables
Expenditure recovery
(total, capital, and
current)

Transportation
investment
(total, capital, and
current)

Measurement
Transportation Expenditure in FY 2009, 2010, 2011 –
Expenditure in FY 2008

All expenditures are separately computed with State total
transportation, transportation capital outlay, transportation
current expenditure.

All expenditures are standardized by 1000 state residents
Transportation Expenditure in FY 2009, 2010, 2011

All expenditures are separately computed with State total
transportation, transportation capital outlay, transportation
current expenditure.

All expenditures are standardized by 1000 state residents

The explanatory variables are the amount of the two types of grant per capita, as
well as government capacity, state needs, state politics, fiscal institution, and legislature
control on DOT. First, I test impact of ARRA grants. The theoretical background for grant

Subsidies, interest on debt, and Insurance Benefits and Repayments.” Expenditures for repairs, such as
works and structures, are “classified as current operation expenditure.”
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effects on expenditures is the flypaper effect—which originates from the literature on
public finance. The implication of the flypaper effect is that, for increases of expenditure,
the effects of grants are greater than the effects of income (Fisher, 2007, p. 218). Although
the flypaper effect initially emerged as an explanation for the effects of lump-sum grants,
it has also been used for other types of grants. Most research that accounts for the flypaper
effect suggests that federal grants increase subnational government expenditures (e.g.,
Nesbit & Kreft, 2009). However, some research reports that these grants induce crowdingout effects on the governments (e.g., Knight, 2002). Therefore, the present study uses
ARRA grants as an independent variable—and tests how and how much the independent
variable affects expenditure recovery and investment. To compare impacts of the two granttypes, I distinguished and entered both discretionary and formula grants in the regression
models. As described in Table 19, ARRA grants per capita are measured by the outlay of
grants per capita.

Table 19 Operationalization of grants
Variables
ARRA grants per capita

Measurement
Outlay of competitive and formula grants per capita
(FY2009-2011)

Second, referring to previous studies (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2003;
McDermott, 2006) asserting that higher capacity governments are more likely to succeed
in policy performance, the present study assumes that governments with higher capacity
would perform better in the utilization of federal grants to invest in construction rather than
maintenance. In contrast, due to the timeline limits of ARRA grants, lower capacity
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governments that are less proficient at mid-term planning, and do not have sufficient
resources, may use the grants mostly in the maintenance function.
Third, in terms of legislature control of DOT, push-factors and pull-factors affect
expenditure size. According to Niskanen’s budget-maximization model, bureaucracies are
incentivized to expand budgets due to the interests of their organizations. In the Iron
Triangle model, alliances exist between bureaucracy and committee members of the
legislature. Moreover, Bureaucratic Politics model also assumes the existence of such
alliances (e.g., instances where bureaucrats allocate funds for politicians who previously
supported DOT—as a gratitude) (Rich, 1989). Meanwhile, the legislature may hinder
bureaucratic spending. Every state has an oversight system in which each committee
controls and collaborates with DOT not only during the session but also during out-ofsession periods. Thus, the present study advances an index of legislature control using
survey data from AASHTO (American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials) 38, and tests how this index affects DOT expenditure.
To estimate the legislature control index, I utilized principal component analysis,
as seen in Table 20. From the analysis, we can store factor scores and variance values. By
using the variance values as weighting for each component, we can calculate total value of

38

AASHTO survey has “interactions b/w DOT & legislature data” part with 13 questions and answers
in terms of oversight mechanisms over DOT, review authority over DOT rules, and legislative role in
surplus funds, reallocations, PPPs, and design-build. Examples of the 13 Survey Questions are: Ongoing oversight by legislative committee (1/0), Legislature performs program reviews or performance
audits (1/0), Legislature reviews non-legislative programs or performance audits (1/0), DOT Reporting
Requirements to the Legislature and/or Legislative Committee (1/0), Legislature requests information
from the DOT(1/0), Is the DOT authorized to retain surplus funds? (1/0), Is legislative approval
required to move funds between projects? (1/0)
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the interaction, which is computed with the summation of product of a weighing and a
factor score, by each state.
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = Wm � Fmi
i=1

where i means each state, W is a weighting, m indicates each component, and F means a
factor score.

Table 20 Operationalization of relation between state DOT and legislature
Variables
Legislature control

Measurement
Factor analysis from 13 questions

The study collected data from multiple sources, including Recovery.gov, Annual
Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, National Conference of State Legislatures,
USAspending.gov, the Book of States, U.S. Census, etc. Detailed information of each
variable is described in the Table 21 below. All explanatory variables reflect values in
2008-2010.
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Table 21 Data source
Variable
Expenditure
Recovery
Transportation
investment
ARRA grant
Government
Capacity (GC)

State Needs

State Politics

Fiscal
Institution
Legislature
control

Expenditure recovery on total transportation,
transportation capital outlays, transportation
current operation expenditure
Expenditure on total transportation,
transportation capital outlays, transportation
current operation expenditure
ARRA competitive and formula grant
Human resource capacity1: size of human
resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of human
resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
revenue
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for
grant
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters
Governor’s propensity
Divided government
Party control of legislature
TELs
BBRs
Index of legislature control

Source
U.S. Census (State
Government
Finances)

Recovery.gov
Annual Survey of
Public Employment
& Payroll
Book of States and
Census Bureau
GPP report 2008
USAspending.gov
Census Bureau
Bureau of Labor
Statistics
Census Bureau
National Conference
of State Legislatures
Amiel et al. (2009)
NCSL (2010)
AASHTO survey,
author’s computation
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Chapter V. EMPIRICAL RESULT
Chapter V presents empirical results according to the three research questions on ARRA
transportation grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. This chapter includes two
sections: (1) descriptive results of all dependent variables and (2) regression results for
each analytic model.

5.1. Descriptive results
Prior to the presentation of regression results, this section sets forth descriptive
results dependent variables by each research question. Each table below includes rankings
in the first column, a list of states ordered by ranking, and values of each variable. In the
tables, top five and bottom five states were selected for instance of the variables.
Table 22 Descriptive results of grant acquisition (2011)
Ranking

State

per capita ($)

State

Total($ million)

1

WA

137.05

CA

3419.94

2

IL

134.30

IL

1726.87

3

AK

124.14

WA

935.00

4

VT

104.74

NY

837.86

5

CA

90.71

NC

566.18

46

KS

6.01

WY

14.58

47

VA

4.16

ND

11.83

48

GA

3.91

ID

10.95

49

NH

3.31

NH

4.37

50

DE

2.65

DE

2.41
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Table 22 ranks states in order of the amount of the acquired transportation grants,
California secured $ 3419.94 million and was ranked first place. Illinois follows as the
second state that acquired more grants. Meanwhile, Delaware was the lowest state that
obtained the smallest amount of grant dollars, $ 2.41 million.

Table 23 Descriptive results of grant implementation (2011)
Ranking State

Competitive (%)

State

Formula (%)

State

Total (%)

1

NE

100

SD

99.26111

UT

99.31421

2

NH

100

ME

99.11671

SD

99.22146

3

UT

99.85898

WY

99.11353

WY

98.96432

4

SD

98.876

UT

99.09926

NH

98.05435

5

ND

98.25278

MT

98.73051

ND

97.60734

46

RI

14.2821

GA

73.76883

HI

58.65316

47

WA

13.54395

NY

72.65414

NC

57.05924

48

IL

10.73007

FL

71.65395

WA

48.61869

49

NC

10.30709

VA

65.18724

IL

46.32236

50

CA

10.21289

HI

55.67302

CA

45.86135

Regarding the second research question of grant implementation, Table 23 sorts
states by three variables: competitive grant, formula grant, and total grant. Overall, Utah
and South Dakoda were ranked in the top five cluster for all grant categories. Whereas
California, Washington, and North Carolina, which acquired larger grants, were ranked in
the bottom five group. It infers that there is a negative association between the amount of
the grant and the implementation rate.
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There is a large variation of expenditure recovery across the top and bottom
clusters, as described in Table 24. For example, North Dakoda and South Dakoda recovered
the level of transportation capital outlays much better than Kentucky and Florida. As
explained in connection with Table 23, overall, good performers in grant implementation,
such as SD and ND, are likely to be good at expenditure recovery.

Table 24 Descriptive results of expenditure recovery (per capita $, 2011)
Ranking State

Total

State

Capital

State

Current

1

ND

322.1045

ND

217.9644

AK

58.40176

2

SD

177.8293

SD

175.5382

ND

57.47378

3

VT

174.8483

VT

166.759

TN

40.66714

4

OK

124.8836

UT

133.3282

MN

34.16666

5

ME

123.8625

ME

131.2376

AL

25.17232

46

GA

-86.8751

GA

-82.7672

MA

-28.9669

47

HI

-104.757

TX

-90.4364

NM

-50.9843

48

MD

-119.458

AK

-109.842

MD

-59.3707

49

FL

-130.097

FL

-110.874

VA

-59.8894

50

KY

-165.45

KY

-163.135

WY

-77.9645

Table 25 presents the pattern across three variables, in which bolded states are
examples to show the pattern. The top five states in total grant acquisition, such as CA, IL,
WA, NY, and NC, tend to implement grants slowly. It implies that a higher level of grant
acquisition would increase task complexity regarding grant implementation. Moreover, a
higher level of implementation performance seems to contribute to a higher level of
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expenditure recovery. For example, SD, ND, and UT were ranked in the higher position of
the implementation category, and they were also included in the top five group of
expenditure recovery.

Table 25 Comparison of states in three stages of ARRA
Ranking Grant Acquisition

Implementation

Expenditure recovery

per capita

Total

Competitive

1

WA

CA

NE

SD

UT

ND

ND

AK

2

IL

IL

NH

ME

SD

SD

SD

ND

3

AK

WA

UT

WY

WY

VT

VT

TN

4

VT

NY

SD

UT

NH

OK

UT

MN

5

CA

NC

ND

MT

ND

ME

ME

AL

46

KS

WY

RI

GA

HI

GA

GA

MA

47

VA

ND

WA

NY

NC

HI

TX

NM

48

GA

ID

IL

FL

WA

MD

AK

MD

49

NH

NH

NC

VA

IL

FL

FL

VA

50

DE

DE

CA

HI

CA

KY

KY

WY
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Formula Total Total Capital Current

5.2. Regression results
This section includes three subsections according to the three research questions
on ARRA transportation grant acquisition, implementation, and impact. Each subsection
presents interpretations on descriptive statistics and regression statistics.

5.2.1. Grant acquisition
The first research question examines the effect of state government capacity on
ARRA grant competition, controlling for other plausible factors that might affect grant
allocation. To test the effect, I estimate the models using the dependent variable (i.e.,
amount of grants allocated to states by the federal DOT and its agencies) and explanatory
variables encompassing government capacity components, federal politics variables, and
state needs factors.
First, Table 26 presents descriptive statistics. The mean of the total obligated
discretionary grants is $215.13 million; the standard deviation, $547.20 million, is larger
than the mean—reflecting significant variation across states in the acquisition of grants.
The number of DOT full-time employees per 1000 residents is 1.23 on average, and the
largest number is 4.37. Details for the other variables are presented in the table below.
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Table 26 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Total amount of obligated competitive
215.13
547.20
2.409
3419.9
grants in $ million
4.23
1.36
0.88
8.14
Log (amount of competitive grants)
Human resource capacity1: size of human
1.23
0.78
0.27
4.37
resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of
8.139
1.238
6.026
12.399
human resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
0.2689
0.0695
0.168
0.442
revenue
General management capacity: policy
7.9
1.87
4
12
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for
23.75
33.86
2.58
183.27
grant
House Appropriations Committee 1
1.34
1.65
0
7
House Transportation Committee 2
1.48
1.72
0
7
Urbanization
1.92
2.57
0.01
11.74
Median voters
50.7
7.87
36.45
66.18
Economic condition
5.28
1.27
3
8.3
Note. The number of observations for all variables is 50. The statistics of all explanatory
variables represent values in FY2008

Second, Table 27 presents the result of the log-linear regression model with
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, which includes the six components of GC, two
political variables, and three environmental factors in order to estimate the effect of each.
According to the F-test (prob> F = 0.000), the null hypothesis that all coefficients are
jointly zero is rejected. The adjusted R-squared indicates that this model explains 69% of
the variation in the dependent variable. In addition, the model is tested to check for issues
of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and omitted variable. The Variance Inflation Factor
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(VIF) 39 indicates “the degree to which the variance has been inflated because regressor k
is not orthogonal to the other regression” (Baum, 2006, p. 85), and if the largest value of
VIF is smaller than 10, the probability of a collinearity problem is low. In the model, all
VIF is smaller than 3.2, indicating no evidence of multicollinearity. Moreover, the BreuschPagan / Cook-Weisberg test is run for heteroskedasticity 40, in which the null hypothesis
that assumes constant variance is not rejected. Finally, according to the Ramsey RESET
test 41, the null hypothesis that assumes no omitted variables in the model is also not rejected.
Turning to the effects of the explanatory variables in Table 27, the components of
GC—human resource capacity 1 & 2 and general management capacity—are associated
with grant acquisitions of state governments. Other components do not indicate significant
effects.
The two human resource capacity components indicate different effects on the
amount of grants. Human resource capacity 2—quality of human resource, measured by
payrolls of full-time DOT employees compared to state median income—is statistically
and positively significant for acquiring grants. In other words, governments that have
higher quality labor forces, or treat their employees generously, are more likely to acquire
larger grants. Specifically, the expected change in log of ARRA grant increases by 0.4655
with respect to a one-unit change of human resource capacity 2, holding all other variables
constant. In other words, the one-unit change of human resource 2 augments ARRA grant

39

Stata syntax is vif.

40

Stata syntax is hettest, iid. In the result, chi2(1)=0.18, Prob > chi2 = 0.6707

41

Stata syntax is ovtest. In the result, F(3, 36) = 0.47, Prob > F = 0.7047
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acquisition by 59.28%. However, human resource capacity 1—size of the human
resource—has negative effects on grant acquisition. Per additional unit change of the size
of full-time employees, the amount of grants decreases approximately by 45.23%,
calculated by 100 x (e-0.602-1). This implies that a large government does not have an
advantage in acquiring grants. Meanwhile, the results indicate previous experience is
positively significant on grant competition, which means states that acquired more grants
than other states are likely to obtain ARRA grants.

Table 27 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity on Grant Acquisition
Coef.

S.E.

Human resource capacity1: size of human
resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of human
resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
expenditure
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for
grant
House Appropriations Committee
House Transportation Committee
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters
Constant

-0.602***

0.190

Standardized
Beta Coef.
-0.345

0.4655***

1.245

0.423

-0.007

2.150

-0.000

0.075

0.065

0.102

0.014***

0.005

0.336

-0.123
0.293***
-0.035
0.038
0.025
-1.380

0.120
0.099
0.054
0.127
0.019
1.702

-0.149
0.369
-0.066
0.353
0.142
.

Number of Observations
Prob>F
Adjusted R-squared
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
50 states. All regressors reflect values in 2008

50
0.000
0.6813
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In terms of control variables, the results show that political factors do shape the
outcome of grant competitions. Consistent with prior research, we find support for the Pork
Barrel hypothesis, which has been discussed and tested in a number political science
studies. Members of the House Committee on Transportation are likely to exercise their
political leverage to benefit their own states, as suggested by the positive and statistically
significant coefficient of the House Transportation Committee variable. Yet,
representatives sitting on the Appropriations Committee do not seem to exercise much
influence on the outcomes of grant competitions. The other control variables are not
statistically significant.
Admittedly, arguments of public administration and political science do make
sense, according to the results that show statistical significance of GC and federal politics
variables. So, the present study intends to demonstrate which factor has greater effects on
ARRA grant competition. Standardized beta coefficients can facilitate this objective, as the
beta coefficient of each explanatory variable indicates how many standard deviations of
the dependent variable would change given one standard deviation change in independent
variables. Thus, the beta coefficient of human resource capacity 2 (0.423) is larger than the
beta coefficient of the Transportation Committee variable (0.369), which implies that the
impact of GC is greater than the impact of federal politics in grant competition.

92

5.2.2. Grant Implementation
The second research question concerns grant implementation. This study
investigates whether states did right to meet the purpose of the ARRA grants, which aimed
to facilitate economic recovery through government expenditure and rapid spending by
recipient governments. Consequently, I tested if government capacity played an important
role in the pacing of grant implementation.
To test this research question, I set three dependent variables: total grant
implementation rate, discretionary grant implementation rate, and formula grant
implementation rate. As presented in Table 28, total grant implementation rates, which
were calculated as ARRA grant outlays over obligations and expressed as percentage points,
have a mean value of 71.77% and standard deviation of 27.24%. The implementation rate
of discretionary grants is 63.53% (mean) and the rate of formula grants is 75.65%, which
indicate that state governments more easily spent formula grants, compared to
discretionary grants.
Aside from variables that were used in the grant acquisition model, several
variables that affect government spending were controlled. Republican governors occupy
half of the 50 states. Divided governments, in which the governor’s political party did not
control both houses in the legislature, existed in less than 25 states. The percentage of states
with Republican-controlled legislatures was 38%. Fiscal institutions, such as TELs, were
also utilized to predict the ARRA grant implementation rate.
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Table 28 Descriptive statistics on Grant Implementation (2009-2012)
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

71.77

Std.
Dev.
27.24

Total Implementation

4.32

100

Discretionary Grant Implementation

63.53

30.14

0

100

Formula Grant Implementation

75.65

28.62

3.75

100

Human resource capacity1: size of human
resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of
human resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation
revenue
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for
grant
Urbanization

1.18

0.77

0.24

4.37

8.439

1.303

5.86

12.889

0.261

0.072

0.157

0.558

7.9

1.85

4

12

30.02

48.86

0

411.77

194.34

257.36

1.20

1196.71

Median voters

50.537

7.929

35.078

71.122

Economic condition

7.57

2.18

3

13.8

Governor’s propensity (Republican)

0.5

0.50

0

1

Divided government

0.43

0.50

0

1

Republican legislature

0.38

0.49

0

1

TELs

8.34

7.88

0

25

BBRs

2.44

0.806

0

3

Note. The number of observations for all variables is 200. The statistics of all explanatory
variables represent one-year lagged values, except time-invariant variables (General
management capacity, TEL, and BBR)
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To estimate models, I use the Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) technique,
because autocorrelation occurs in all models 42 and heteroscedasticity occurs in Models 2 43.
PCSE is appropriate in this case because it allows me to account for the heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation problems in the data. Table 29 presents the regression results—using
data covering 2009-2012—from three models with three dependent variables:
discretionary grant implementation rate, formula grant implementation rate, and total grant
implementation rate.
I start with the independent variables (i.e., the components of government capacity)
to explain the regression results. First, the results show that human resource capacity 1—
size of human resource—is positively and statistically significant on the dependent
variables in Model 3. Specifically, one additional unit change in the number of DOT fulltime employees per 1000 residents increases the percentage point of implementation rate
of total grants by approximately 5.15, holding other variables constant. Though
discretionary grant implementation is affected by human resource capacity 1, in which the
coefficient is 2.544, it is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, human resource capacity
2—which indicates the competence of DOT employees measured by the relative
remuneration level compared to median income—seems to have positive effects on grant
implementation (formula and total grant); however, it is not statistically significant. Second,

42

Wooldridge test is conducted, in which the null hypothesis is that there is no first-order
autocorrelation. Test results reveal the null hypotheses for all models are rejected, which means all
models probably have the first-order autocorrelation.
43
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is run for checking the challenge of heteroskedasticity. The
test reports Model 2 has the problem of heteroskedasticity, based on the results, chi2(1)=0.00 and Prob
> chi2 = 0.9790.
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per capita transportation own source, as the proxy of financial resource capacity, is
positively associated with formula and total grants and its effect is statistically significant.
Third, general management capacity, reflecting infrastructure management, is the other GC
component that has significant effect on formula grant implementation. In sum, greater size
of administration, more revenue sources, and more experience in handling federal grants
are likely to serve state governments well in rapid grant implementation.
One interesting point, which emerged from the empirical evidence of GC in all
models, is the effect of financial resource capacity. As seen in Tables 29, financial resource
capacity (transportation revenue) is associated only with formula and total grants. A
possible explanation for why the positive effect of financial resource capacity is significant
only in formula and total grants relates to the nature of funding system. Discretionary grants
under ARRA are primarily for new projects and allocated by the review of applications;
however, a formula grant is normally for current projects or maintenance, and is
automatically distributed following the federal DOT’s specified formula. So, the
predictable fund (i.e., a formula-based grant) is likely statistically associated with the ratio
of own source revenue—compared to the less predictable fund: competitive grant.
Moreover, the amount of discretionary grant program is approximately one-tenth of
formula-based grants, which means that discretionary grants would not likely have
statistical relation with own source revenue.
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Table 29 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity on Grant Implementation
Discretionary(Model 1)
S.E
Coef.
2.544
4.037

Formula (Model 2)
S.E
Coef.
1.989
2.875

Total (Model 3)
S.E
Coef.
5.153**
2.303

-1.4374

2.556

1.6077

1.5278

0.7447

5.947

39.64

192.67***

34.746

153.25*** 34.309

-2.104

1.439

1.013

1.427

1.297

0.824

0.030

0.044

0.108***

0.035

0.103**

0.050

Urbanization
Economic
Condition
Median voter

-0.041*** 0.009

-0.042**

0.018

-0.039*

0.021

1.180

1.027

12.125***

0.653

10.679*** 2.029

0.395

0.302

0.541*

0.288

0.465*

0.246

Republican
Governor
Divided
government
Republican
legislature
BBRs

4.855

4.285

1.468

2.865

2.970

2.056

-0.713

4.077

-3.353

2.686

-3.173

2.891

10.551*

5.791

18.416***

3.746

19.327*** 4.919

0.282

2.989

-4.964**

2.324

-4.989**

2.433

TELs

0.145

0.168

-1.321***

0.279

-1.281***

0.241

Constant

53.058*

31.48

-106.8***

24.982

-86.421**

37.215

Implementation
Human resource
capacity1
Human resource
capacity2
Financial resource
capacity
General
management
capacity
Previous
experience

1.6702

Number of
196
196
196
Observations
Number of groups
49
49
49
R2
0.6424
0.5676
0.6393
Prob> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E. indicates panel corrected standard error in
Model 1 & 3, and heteroskedastic corrected standard error in Model 2. Time period: 4
waves (2009-2012). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). Human resource capacity1: size of
human resource, Human resource capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on
infrastructure management, Previous experience: policy experience on grant
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For control variables’ impact on grant implementation pace, three variables
representing state needs are reported as they are statistically significant in explaining
dependent variables. Population density, the proxy of urbanization, has a negative effect,
which indicates that more urbanized states will have correspondingly less success in
implementing ARRA grants in a timely manner. The positive effect of economic condition
is statistically significant in Model 2 and 3, which implies that higher unemployment rates
induce state governments to implement ARRA grants quickly as a mechanism of
stimulative economic policy. Finally, the median voter variable affects formula and total
grants, which indicates that higher level of median income increases the pace of grant
implementation. Additionally, according to the regression results, state politics are
somewhat meaningful. Legislature control by Republicans is a variable that shows
statistically strong evidence for explaining the dependent variable because the variable’s
p-value is less than 1% of the significance level in Models 2 and 3. This implies that
Republicans in the legislature are likely to support the rapid implementation of grants.
However, divided government, meaning the governor’s political party does not control at
least one house in the legislature, has no significant effects. Republican governor also did
not have statistically significant effects. Lastly, the other control variable, fiscal institution,
shows negative effects on formula and total grants. This is consistent with intuition and
prior literature in that stringent rules for financial management would hinder governments
in the disbursement of funds.
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5.2.3. Grant Impact on Government Expenditure
This section presents the impact of ARRA grants on recipient government
expenditures. I categorized ARRA grants, the independent variable, into discretionary and
formula grants. Also, I classified expenditure, the dependent variable, into capital outlays,
current operation expenditure, and total expenditure. Empirical tests in this section
investigated if discretionary and formula grants affected state governments’ three
expenditures on transportation.
First, I determined how many states increased, in nominal terms, their
transportation expenditure since the Great Recession. Table 30 shows that thirty-one states
increased expenditure on transportation in FY 2009, compared to FY 2008. In FY 2010 and
FY 2011, thirty-three and twenty-six states, respectively, expanded their spending.
Specifically, when examining the two categories of expenditure (capital outlays and current
operation), states tended to increase funds for capital outlays, rather than for current
operation since FY 2008. In FY 2009, the number of states that increased funds on capital
outlays was thirty-one, however only twenty-six states expanded their spending on current
operation. Moreover, the statistics show the number of states that spent more money on
transportation, whichever the expenditure is of total, capital or current operation, slightly
declined from FY 2009 to FY 2011. This implies that states on the whole did not implement
expansionary fiscal policies on transportation, because the shock of the Great Recession
affected states even after the end of the recession.
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Table 30 Number of states that expand spending
Variable
Recovery in transportation total expenditure

2009
31

2010
33

2011
26

Recovery in transportation capital outlays

31

31

26

Recovery in transportation current operation

26

24

21

I now present descriptive statistics of variables that were used in the regression
models. First, state government expenditures, which are adjusted to real values in 2012
dollars and standardized by the number of residents, were organized into six types.
Recovery amount in transportation of total expenditure, measured by the difference of
transportation expenditure in each fiscal year and FY 2008, has a mean value of $17.59
during the post-recession period (2009-2011).The mean value of recovery in capital
outlays— measured by the same method used for total transportation expenditure
recovery—was $16.49. However, the amount of recovery in current operation expenditure
after the recession in 2008 was -$1.83 as the mean during the three years. For the evidence
of the mean values of three recovery variables in Table 31 and the tendency of spending
expansion in Table 30, the study interprets them as states were not sufficiently recovered
for the three years of the post-recession.
Third, the mean of total transportation expenditure was $498.46 for the three years
spanning FY 2009-2011; the mean of capital outlays for transportation was $289.98, and
the mean of current operation expenditure was $147.79. Approximately 58% of
transportation expenditure was used for capital outlays.
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Table 31 Descriptive statistics on Grant Impact
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

17.590

Std.
Dev.
72.803

Recovery in transportation total
expenditure
Recovery in transportation capital
outlays
Recovery in transportation current
operation
Total transportation expenditure

-165.45

322.105

16.493

63.846

-163.14

217.964

-1.833

23.494

-118.60

58.402

498.455

290.811

195.673

2210.536

Transportation Capital outlays

289.983

172.954

84.903

1222.667

Transportation current operation
expenditure
ARRA discretionary grants outlays

147.787

140.479

46.522

1022.134

9.286

14.931

0

114.255

ARRA formula grants outlays

84.490

60.422

4.225

297.483

Human resource capacity1: size of
human resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of
human resource
Financial resource capacity:
transportation revenue
General management capacity: policy
experience for infrastructure
management
Urbanization

1.202

0.767

0.237

4.371

8.36

1.27

5.86

12.40

0.262

0.070

0.157

0.464

7.9

1.853

4

12

1.932

2.567

0.012

11.869

Median voters

50.117

7.604

35.078

66.6332

Economic condition

7.481

2.371

3

13.8

Governor’s propensity (Republican)

0.447

0.499

0

1

Divided government

0.486

0.502

0

1

Republican legislature

0.286

0.453

0

1

TELs

8.34

7.889

0

25

BBRs

2.44

0.806

0

3

Legislature Control

0.000

0.294

-1.032

0.483

Note. The number of observations for all variables is 150. The statistics of all explanatory
variables represent one-year lagged values, except time-invariant variables (general
management capacity, TEL, and legislature control)
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Fourth, following the explanatory variables that were presented in the first and the
second research questions and results, Table 31 presents fiscal institutions, legislature
control of bureaucracy, and the received ARRA grants. Stringency of TELs has a score of
8.34 out of 25 as its mean value, which implies that states do not have particularly strict
rules on TELs. The mean of per capita ARRA discretionary grants for transportation was
$9.29 and its standard deviation was $14.93, which indicates substantial variation across
recipients. The ARRA formula grants’ mean was $84.49, which is nearly nine times greater
than that of discretionary grants.
Turning to the results of the regression models, I present two different perspectives.
One concerns which factors affect expenditure recovery (Table 32), and the other concerns
general determinants analysis (Table 33), focusing on the three years of post-recession. The
effects of the explanatory variables were estimated using linear regression with the Panel
Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) estimator. Models 1-6 have heteroscedasticity 44
problems and Models 1-2 have additional issues of autocorrelation 45. To manage these
problems, I used the PCSE technique, assuming panel-level heteroskedastic errors and
panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure.

44

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg tests for checking the challenge of heteroskedasticity indicate all
models have heteroscedasticity.
45

To check autocorrelation, Wooldridge test is conducted. Its null hypothesis is that there is no firstorder autocorrelation. The test for Model 1 shows F(1, 48)=5.191 and Prob>F=0.027, and for Model 2
shows F(1, 48)=10.363 and Prob>F=0.0023. The test results mean that the null hypothesis is rejected
and there is autocorrelation.
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Table 32 Predicting the Effect of GC and Grants on Expenditure Recovery
Total (Model1)

Capital Outlays
(Model 2)

Coef.
1.108*

S.E
0.651

Coef.
1.298**

S.E
0.639

Current
expenditure
(Model 3)
Coef.
S.E
0.189
0.316

-0.201

0.133

0.030

0.121

-0.138

0.090

-27.4***

9.904

-18.80**

8.466

-3.884

4.556

HR capacity2

6.271

4.151

6.549*

3.378

3.774**

1.482

Financial resource
capacity
General management
capacity

546.46*** 108.07

346.8***

101.83

110.74*** 35.50

-1.826

3.322

1.439

3.632

-2.199**

0.854

Urbanization

-8.92***

3.296

-6.861**

2.728

-2.294**

1.016

Economic Condition

-2.824

1.748

-2.301

1.536

-0.939

0.718

Median voter

-2.01***

0.755

-0.857

0.631

-0.508

0.317

Governor’s
propensity(Republica
n)
Divided government

21.240**

9.775

7.334

10.330

14.32***

4.745

10.258

11.173

1.982

9.547

0.157

4.450

Republican
legislature
TELs

18.304

12.533

27.637**

11.653

-5.109

6.001

-1.291*

0.736

-1.481**

0.699

0.052

0.241

BBRs

-4.064

6.118

-0.339

6.522

-0.012

2.231

Legislature Control

0.739

21.363

17.172

20.082

-4.079

6.420

Constant

10.470

63.017

-47.968

55.790

-4.207

28.43

Recovery
ARRA discretionary
grant outlays
ARRA formula grant
outlays
HR capacity1

Number of
147
147
147
Observations
Number of groups
49
49
49
2
R
0.7275
0.4430
0.2995
Prob> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E indicates heteroskedastic corrected standard
error. Time period: 3 waves (2009-2011). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). HR capacity1:
size of human resource, HR capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on
infrastructure management
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Expenditure recovery is depicted in Table 32. Models 1-3 explain the recovery as
a function of ARRA grants outlay, GC, state needs, state politics, and fiscal institutions.
The first point of interpretation is the effect of grant. Discretionary grants did affect
expenditure recovery for the three years (2009-2011), whereas formula grants were not
statistically significant in expenditure recovery. One possible explanation can be adduced
to interpret the result. Although the amount of discretionary grants is much smaller than
formula grants, the achievement of competitive grants implies recipients’ positive
willingness to spend the grant, which played an important role in the recovery. In addition
to the effectiveness of discretionary grants, one interesting point is that ARRA competitive
grants affected only capital outlays and total expenditure. According to Census statistics,
capital outlays indicate construction, replacement, addition, and other improvement.
Expenditure for repairs is classified as a current operation expenditure. Thus, we can
explain that ARRA competitive grants induced states to spend more funds on capital
investments.
Second, GC components have substantial effects on the recovery. Surprisingly,
human resource capacity 1 negatively affected the recovery. When holding other variable
constant, additional increase in the size of human resource decreases the total expenditure
recovery (per capita) by $27.42. Meanwhile, financial resource capacity had positive
effects on all kinds of expenditures recovery. That is, the more own-source revenue for
transportation a state has, the greater recovery it achieves.
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Table 33 Predicting the Effect of Government Capacity and Grants on Expenditure

Coef.
5.861**

S.E
2.692

Coef.
3.010*

S.E
1.695

Current
expenditure
(Model 6)
S.E
Coef.
3.483**
1.559

0.304

0.576

0.397

0.374

-0.285

226.23***

34.770

132.39***

19.261

119.03*** 18.224

HR capacity2

20.490

13.245

10.459

8.725

3.100

6.038

Financial resource
capacity
General
management
capacity

774.42*** 244.953 438.77**

182.88

134.225

110.31

0.014

7.073

4.282

4.297

-8.488**

3.910

Urbanization

-37.19***

6.419

-14.83***

3.905

-13.53***

3.634

Economic Condition

-2.517

5.145

-6.987*

3.763

4.344*

2.506

Median voter

7.234***

2.131

0.809

1.353

5.089***

1.127

Governor’s
propensity
Divided government

56.941**

22.722

23.705

18.085

27.065**

11.651

54.709**

22.334

12.400

17.592

30.389*** 10.739

Republican
legislature
TELs

47.493*

26.772

38.376*

19.713

6.030

11.851

1.525

1.542

2.039*

1.205

0.487

0.830

BBRs

33.681**

14.845

24.487**

11.113

3.379

8.242

Legislature Control

-57.385

37.982

-37.381

30.212

-3.712

19.798

Constant

-615.56*** 192.073 -198.480

129.86

-294.6***

92.002

Expenditure
ARRA discretionary
grant outlays
ARRA formula
grant outlays
HR capacity1

Capital Outlays
(Model 5)

Total (Model 4)

0.298

Number of
147
147
147
Observations
Number of groups
49
49
49
2
R
0.8419
0.7696
0.8462
Prob> chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. S.E indicates heteroskedastic corrected standard
error. Time period: 3 waves (2009-2011). 49 states (Nebraska was omitted.). HR capacity1:
size of human resource, HR capacity2: quality of human resource, Financial resource
capacity: transportation revenue, General management capacity: policy experience on
infrastructure management
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Compared to the recovery, determinants of expenditure during the three postrecession years present different results (Table 33). First, discretionary ARRA grants were
statistically significant. Second, human resource capacity 1 is also differently reported as
it had positive effects on expenditure, compared to negative effects on recovery. Third,
fiscal institutions, TELs and BBRs, were statistically significant on expenditure. They
positively affected expenditure, which indicates that stringent fiscal institutions
paradoxically help to increase government spending. Lastly, divided states were likely to
increase expenditure compared to unitary states, according to Models 4 and 6.
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Chapter VI. CONCLUSION
6.1. Summary and discussion
This dissertation aimed to determine the significance of government capacity (GC),
specifically as a factor in easing the impacts of the recent economic crisis. Taking ARRA
grants as the research case, this dissertation began with a literature review (Chapter II) of
the three stages of an ARRA grant: grant competition, implementation, and impact. The
review revealed gaps in literature pertaining to the lack of theoretical background for the
link between GC and performance and for the concept and measurement of GC. Chapter
III proposed theoretical backgrounds for the link and the concept. Based on Systems
Theory and Resource Based Theory (RBT), I then established the theoretical framework.
Referring to previous literature, for the present study, I defined the concept of GC as the
ability of a government to outperform others in the acquisition of grant, the implementation
of grant, and the recovery of expenditure. To measure GC in this study, we use its
components: human resource as human resource capacity 1 (the size of human resource),
human resource capacity 2 (the quality of human resource); financial resource as financial
resource capacity; and intellectual ability as general management capacity (infrastructure
management) and previous experience (grant experience). Then, Chapters IV and V
presented empirical models and results. The following sections provide the test results and
discussions.
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6.1.1. Grant acquisition
The first empirical model examines factors that affect ARRA grant competition.
Utilizing the case of federal transportation grants under the Recovery Act, the study
established a model of discretionary grants with independent variables—human resource
capacity, financial resource, and intangible resource capacity. The model covers political
variables following the political science literature and other environmental variables.
From the evidence of the quantitative analysis (Table 34), two government
capacity components—human resource capacity 2 and previous experience—positively
affect grant acquisition. Another component of capacity, human resource capacity 1, has a
negative effect. The results partially support the government capacity hypothesis in which
higher capacity is helpful for acquiring competitive grants.
There is another perspective on explaining the conflicting results between HR
capacity 1 and 2. This is consistent with the implication of cutback management or
turnaround management. Ukeles (1982) stressed efficient and effective management under
constraints of resources, based on his experience in New York City that reduced the
administrative body but achieved the successful rescue in the crisis. It implies “working
smarter” or “doing more with less” is more important than the size of resources. According
to the implication, the negative effect of HR capacity 1 and the positive effect of HR
capacity 2 are natural results, implying that HR quality is more important in the crisis than
HR size.
Financial resource capacity did not have significant effects on the grant acquisition,
and the direction of effects was negative. The result may be due to “decreased demand for
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external funding” (Hall, 2008a, p. 14), which means affluent states with sufficient financial
resources are likely to be passive about federal grant applications. Or the result may be
attributable to a redistributive function of ARRA grants that supports economically
disadvantaged regions (Gimpel et al., 2012; Young & Sobel, 2013).
Positive effects of policy experience are in line with prior literature (e.g., Rich,
1989). Abilities in professional grant writing and appropriate planning are cultivated by
relevant experience on grant applications. Thus it is natural that the result indicates
previous experience variable had positively and statistically significant effects on the grant
acquisition.

Table 34 Summary of tests for grant acquisition

Human resource capacity1: size of human resource
Human resource capacity2: quality of human resource
Financial resource capacity: transportation expenditure
General management capacity: policy experience for
infrastructure management
Previous experience: policy experience for grant
House Appropriations Committee
House Transportation Committee
Urbanization
Economic condition
Median voters

sign of
effect
+

Standardized
Beta Coef.
-0.345
0.423

+

0.336

+

0.369

As a control variable, the number of House Transportation Committee members
from each state is reported as having a positive effect on grant acquisition, which means
the Pork Barrel hypothesis is still valid. However, the other political variable, House
Appropriations Committee, is not significant; so the hypothesis is also partially supported.
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The more interesting result between the government capacity variables and the political
variables concerns the Standardized Beta Coefficients. According to the results, the Beta
Coefficient of HR capacity 2 is greater than that of the House Transportation Committee
variable. These results do not mean only GC matter or politics is not important. As Hall
(2008a) said, the results imply government capacity is a more important factor in the grant
competition situation or, at least, it is not less important than the political factor.

6.1.2. Grant Implementation
I conducted analyses to investigate whether or not government capacity affects
ARRA grant fund implementation in order to answer the second research question. Speedy
implementation of ARRA funds by recipient governments is an indicator of performance
(to evaluate success), because the Recovery Act aimed to stimulate the economy and to
recover subnational governments’ spending.
For the models of the second research question, I inputted government capacity
variables—human resource capacity, financial resource capacity, and intangible resource
capacity— and control variables to explain the variation of ARRA fund implementation.
To compare types of grant, I separately regressed discretionary grants, formula grants, and
total grants.
As seen in Table 35, data and results of the quantitative analyses indicate that
human resource capacity and financial resource capacity have statistically significant
effects on the dependent variables. Moreover, intangible resource capacity (previous
110

experience), measured by the amount of previous funds, is shown to facilitate speedy
implementation during the four years since the ARRA subsidies. Those results are
consistent with prior literature (Carley et al., 2015; Terman and Feiock, 2014). Carley et al.
(2015) also found evidence on the positive effects of relevant experience and financial
management capacity on energy grant implementation. Terman and Feiock (2014) revealed
a negative association between lack of staff capacity and implementation delay.

Table 35 Summary of tests for grant implementation
Implementation

Competitive
(Model 1)

Formula
(Model 2)

Human resource capacity1

Total
(Model 3)
+

Human resource capacity2
Financial resource capacity

+

+

+

+

-

-

Economic Condition

+

+

Median voter

+

+

+

+

BBRs

-

-

TELs

-

-

General management capacity
Previous experience
Urbanization

-

Republican Governor
Divided government
Republican legislature

+

Additionally, states that were less urbanized, faced higher unemployment rates,
and had higher median income are likely to spend the ARRA funds faster than others. This
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implies that these states outperformed—in terms of speedy implementation—other states
that were more urbanized, experienced lower unemployment, and had lower median
income level. Moreover, states with Republican legislature control were more likely to
spend ARRA funds faster than others with Democratic control of legislature. This is a
somewhat different result from the thought that democratic states might have “higher goal
alignments” with the Democratic president’s policy (e.g., Carley et al., 2015; Jennings et
al 2012). Lastly, my data found that more stringent fiscal institutions (TELs and BBRs)
impeded fast implementation, which is consistent with prior literature (Hou & Smith, 2010;
Mahdavi & Westerlund, 2011; Maher & Deller, 2012). From the results of fiscal institutions,
this dissertation does not want to assert that TELs and BBRs are unnecessary rules for the
efficient policy implementation. Rather, the negative statistical association indicates that
the institutions fulfill the roles given to themselves even in the crisis.

6.1.3. Grant Impact and Government Expenditure
The third research question concerned the impact of ARRA grants on recipient
government expenditures. According to the data, had the federal government failed to
provide fiscal assistance, states would have encountered severe deficits and would have
been forced to cut expenditures on most public services. If so, the intellectual curiosity
would be about how much the federal ARRA grants affected states’ recovery of expenditure.
Thus, this study examined the impact of ARRA grants on the recovery (2009-2011) and on
expenditures (2009-2011), in which the recovery and expenditures were categorized into
total, capital and current operation.
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In terms of dependent variables, the study set recovery variables as the amount of
change in transportation expenditure (total, capital, and current) between each year and FY
2008, and expenditure as each year’s transportation expenditure. Key independent
variables are ARRA discretionary grants and ARRA formula grants. I classified these
variables to test effects of the two grants allocated by different method and process. In
addition, I investigated whether or not government capacity had effects on the recovery
and expenditures.
According to the test results (Table 36), between the two ARRA grant-types only
discretionary grants had statistically significant on and positively affected expenditure
recovery and transportation investment. This implies that despite having relatively smaller
dollar-amounts of subsidy, the acquired competitive grant was more effective than the
distributed formula grant as a stimulus to increase spending. These results may come from
the nature of different types of grants. Formula grants are allocated by the pre-existing
criteria that recipients anticipate how much they can receive. So, formula grants are likely
to be used in current operation and ongoing projects. In contrast, subnational government
must prepare a project by a well-designed plan in order to apply for a competitive grant.
So, competitive grants are likely to induce recipients to spend funds on capital outlays and
new projects. In addition, the result indicates that ARRA grants increased transportation
expenditures. This result rebuts Knight (2002) that insisted crowding-out effects of the
federal highway grants.
Turning to GC components, the regression results show their coefficients are
significant on both transportation expenditure recovery and investment. Financial resource
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capacity’s positive effects were consistently significant on recovery and expenditures.
Because financial resource indicates transportation revenue, states with a higher level of
resources can increase transportation expenditures more than ones with a lower level of
resources. Human resource (HR) capacities showed contradictory results. HR capacity 2
had statistically and positively significant effects only on expenditure recovery. HR
capacity 1 had negative effects on recovery, but positive effects on expenditure.
Expenditure recovery and transportation investment are all significant purposes of ARRA.
However, in the crisis situation, the more important thing or the higher priority was to
recover subnational governments’ expenditure level at least on the same plane as the prerecession level. In this perspective, the regression results imply that the quality of HR,
rather than HR size, was more helpful for overcoming the recession.
For other control variables, similar to the test results of implementation, less
urbanized states were likely to do well in recovery and spend more. It implies that
presumably, more urbanized states had more difficulty than less urbanized ones in
implementing grants and recovering expenditure due to more complicated conditions.
Regarding political propensity, Republican states tended to have advantages in the recovery
and the expansion of expenditure—according to the coefficients of political variables. In
addition, the variable, BBRs, was reported as leverages to increase transportation
expenditures. This result seemingly contradicts prior studies. However, possible answers
can be made, when focusing on the different dependent variable and the analysis case.
Previous literature (e.g., Alt & Lowry, 1994; Hou & Smith, 2010; Mahdavi & Westerlund,
2011; Poterba, 1994) revealed BBRs were positively associated with ‘fund balance.’ The
analytic model dealt with 2009-2011 when federal grants influx sharply increased and
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states continued to increase expenditure. Or maybe states with the fiscal institutions (i.e.
BBRs and TELs) learn to manage their finances better with less. Thus, it is possible that
the regression result of BBR is not wholly contrary to the prior literature.

Table 36 Summary of tests for grant impact

ARRA discretionary grant

Expenditure Recovery
(Model 1-3)
Total Capital Current

Transportation Investment
(Model 4-6)
Total Capital Current

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

ARRA formula grant
Human resource capacity1
Human resource capacity2
Financial resource capacity

+

+

+

+

+

General management capacity
Urbanization

-

-

-

-

Economic Condition
Median voter

-

Governor’s propensity
(Republican)
Divided government

+

Republican legislature
TELs

+

+
-

-

-

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

+
+

BBRs

+

Legislature Control

115

+

6.2. Conclusion
This dissertation began with questions about government capacity and its role in
the critical situation experienced by all states globally: the significant economic shock of
the Great Recession. Through the quantitative multivariate analyses, I found strong
evidence of the impact of government capacity.
Overall, government capacity of states played a significant role in the conjuncture
of ARRA situation. For states with higher government capacity, strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis was used to explain how their strength (S) of
capacity turned the threat (T) of the Great Recession to their advantage for opportunity (O)
for restoration and development—compensating for weakness (W). However, according to
types of capacity and to phases of the ARRA funds (acquisition, implementation, and
impact), the effects of capacity were shown to be somewhat different.
Specifically, the size of human resource (human resource capacity 1) was not
helpful for acquiring ARRA grants, but was meaningful for ARRA implementation and the
expansion of expenditures. The quality of human resource (human resource capacity 2)
played an important role in grant acquisition and recovery, but was not significant in
implementation. Financial resource capacity was not significantly different from zero in
grant competition, but consistently positively significant in ARRA grant implementation
and recovery and the increase of expenditure. As an intangible resource, infrastructure
management experience (general management capacity) was mostly insignificant for all
ARRA phases—except the negative effects on recovery and expenditure in current
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operation. Grant experience (previous experience) was positively significant on grant
acquisition and implementation for formula and total grants.

6.2.1. Policy implication
From the empirical test results described above, I found some policy implications.
First, the empirical findings show that internal system factors (i.e., GC components) had
statistically significant impacts. Based on the results and Systems Theory, the present study
recommends that subnational governments concentrate on what they do by themselves at
first rather than what they cannot deal with. For example, governments can control or
develop their capacity, but it is too difficult to influence other external factors, such as
federal actions including federal politics and federal bureaucrats. This study does not intend
to imply that only GC is important or that GC is significantly more critical than other
factors; however, the study does argue that subnational governments benefit from prior
focus on their internal system because they have direct control of this system and thus, they
can effectively manage and refine it in a relatively short time period.
Second, in terms of effects of human resources (HR), the findings indicate the
quality of HR—measured by the relative level of compensation—played a significant role
in the acquisition of ARRA grants and expenditure recovery, whereas the size of HR did
not. This indicates that the quality of HR is more important than the size in coping with
crisis. For enhancing government capacity, especially HR capacity, governments may aim
to increase the number of employees or increase the quality of employees. The empirical
results imply that it is better to focus on quality rather than size. Of course, the relatively
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higher level of compensation may attribute to the higher educated employees or generous
treatment with higher level of salary. In any case, governments would benefit in that higher
educated employees would be likely to produce better outputs and generous treatment
would likely increase employee morale and induce employees to succeed at their jobs.
Third, the empirical test reveals that another GC component, financial resource,
was also important factor—particularly in expenditure recovery. Understandably, larger
financial resource should be a significant capacity for government to disburse funds at a
suitable time and place. Thus, governments must skillfully manage the system for securing
transportation related revenue even in times of calm.
Lastly, the findings present interesting evidence in terms of the impact of ARRA
grants. Although the dollar-amounts of competitive grants are much smaller than that of
formula grants, only competitive grants had statistically and positively significant effects
on expenditure recovery and expenditure. This implies that subnational governments must
focus more on grant competition. Even though significantly more commitments are needed
to plan and apply for competitive grants, competitive transportation grants may be more
useful for governments to recover expenditure level and to invest in transportation.

6.2.2. Contributions
I present three kinds of contributions. This dissertation contributes to the academic
discussion of management by developing a theoretical framework to explain the link
between GC and its performance, based on Systems Theory and Resource Based Theory
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(RBT). It would be valuable for the current discussion in the research literature on how to
account for the relation, in terms of theoretical background.
Another contribution, pertaining to government capacity, is that the present study
provides a conceptualization for the meaning of government capacity—to classify its
components and to operationalize the components with multiple proxies using the two
theories. The present study improves on prior empirical studies that generally did not
provide specific theory or that only used a simple proxy for government capacity (e.g., the
number of public servants).
In terms of the target of analysis, a third contribution of this dissertation is that it
is the first study to investigate the three stages of ARRA transportation grants. The study
revealed that GC played an important role in ARRA grant acquisition, implementation, and
impact. In addition, regarding intergovernmental grants issues, few studies of public
finance have examined the acquisition and implementation of federal grants. Thus, this
dissertation, as a start-up study on this topic, provides initial understanding of the relation
between GC and intergovernmental grants.

6.2.3. Limitations
Policy implication and the contributions notwithstanding, like other empirical
studies, the present study has some weaknesses. First, this study proposes a theoretical
framework by using two background theories: Systems Theory and RBT. Though the
dissertation assumes that the theories can be applied to state government organizations and
utilized lessons of theories, the theories might not be perfectly appropriate for public
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organizations—because they were generated in the field of business administration and
reflect the nature of private organizations.
Second, the operationalization of variables may not perfectly capture the nature of
each variable. This study suggests a theoretical framework for the concept and
measurement of GC, but it might not represent all aspects of GC. For example, I measured
the quality of HR using the relative level of compensation for DOT employees. However,
aside from compensation, there could be other proxies for the quality of HR, such as level
of education, length of service of employees, degree of job-training, etc.
Third, this study includes a small number of observations in the quantitative
analyses, because of the characteristic that ARRA funds are distributed as a one-time-fund.
Especially for the analysis of the first question—the acquisition of ARRA grant—the total
number of observations is 50. Even though this number represents the population (50 states)
under ARRA, this empirical result can be used to explain only the recent recession
(December 2007 – June 2009), and cannot be generalized to explain other situations.
Lastly, this dissertation could not sufficiently control the regional differences of
states, such as project composition and climate. According to location and to other
condition of states, the states have different management task complexity. The dissimilarity
among states may affect the performance of states. Though the study employed
urbanization, economic condition, and the level of income, I could not assert that these
factors are adequate to control the differences.
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6.2.4. Suggestions for Future Research
This dissertation presents a theoretical framework and empirical test results. As
described in the limitations above, however, I cannot assert that the study perfectly
characterizes the relationship between GC and performance or that the proposed theoretical
framework and measurement sufficiently capture the characteristics of variables. The study
provides additional evidence for—and is only one step along the path to explaining—the
role of GC.
Thus, several avenues of research remain available to future studies. First, scholars
can expand the theoretical background beyond the two theories presented here, or develop
a critical application of the theories for public organizations. Scholars may find additional
or alternative theories for the link between GC and performance, or suggest a more analytic
utilization of the theories for the public sector.
Second, qualitative studies may remedy the caveats about the operationalization
of GC. As described above, the quality of HR is too difficult to be measured by using data
released to the public. Future studies should use qualitative methods, such as interviews,
surveys, or focus groups. This would benefit and develop the research literature on public
management.
Lastly, the framework of this dissertation could be replicated at the local level. It
is possible that grant issues are more significant for local governments than for states.
Compared to states, higher variability in GC and performance among localities is expected.
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APPENDIX
Survey Design and Progress
The survey for DOTs of all 50 states was designed in order to supplement the secondary
data analyses. As seen in appendix A, the survey questionnaire consists of three parts: grant
application, human resource management, and transportation expenditure. I expected the
survey would have been useful for explaining grant competition, measuring government
capacity, and obtaining unreleased data for transportation expenditures of construction and
maintenance. However, the survey is not utilized for the dissertation because of the low
response rate (32%) and the quality of responses.
The first distribution of the survey to 50 states was on April 8th, 2016, and followup invitations were sent five times, by using email and the Qualtrics system. I obtained
contact information from each state’s DOT website and AASHTO (American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials). Before September 15th, sixteen states
answered, six states denied answering, and the other twenty-eight states ignored the survey
invitation.
I decided not to use survey answers for empirical analysis in the dissertation for
several reasons. First, the number of responses was too small to utilize for regression
models. Second, some respondents didn’t answer several questions or left a few questions
as N/A. Lastly, I discerned there are unreliable answers. For example, though question 1a
(external consultant effort) and 1b (staffing effort) are related to each other, some states
answered inconsistently. Albeit the shortcomings, however, I report survey questionnaires
and the descriptive results of the survey for readers who might be interested.
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Survey Questionnaire
Part 1: Please answer the following five questions about your agency federal grant
applications.
Q1: Some transportation agencies rely on little or no external technical assistance when
they apply for federal grants. Other agencies utilize significant amount of external
expertise for these applications.
Q1a: On a scale from 1 to 100, what is the percentage of external consultant effort in
federal grant applications for the following years?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q1b: On a scale from 1 to 100, what is the percentage of staffing effort for the following
years?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q2: Please state the amount your agency spent on external consultants on competitive
grants (e.g., TIGER) application for the following years:
Year
Amount (in $)
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q3: A lot of emphasis was placed on shovel readiness of projects considered for
competitive grants (e.g., TIGER) funding. On a scale of 1 to 100, how would you rate the
shovel readiness of the transportation projects in your state for the following years?
Year
Rate
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
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Q4: State your level of agreement with the following statement:
Congressional oversight of competitive grants (e.g., TIGER) funding was more intense
than prior federal transportation grants.
Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

Q5: On a scale of 1 to 100, how would you rate the level of complexity of competitive
grants (e.g., TIGER) applications in each of the following years?
Year
Rate
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q6: For how many competitive grants did your agency apply (including TIGER) in the
following years?
Year
Number
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Part 2: The following set of questions refers to your agency staff and management
practices.
Q7: For each of the following years, what percentage of your workforce approximately
held the PE (Professional Engineer) designation?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q8: For each of the following years, approximately what percent of your management
staff held an advanced degree (e.g., master’s, PhD or JD)?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
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Q9: For each of the following years, list the percentage of your permanent FTE agency
workforce that is exempt from civil service protection?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q10: What percentage of your workforce voluntarily separated during the following
years?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q11: Approximately what percentage of agency payroll was devoted to training and
related employee development in each of the following years?
Year
Percentage
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q12: Many public agencies are suffering from “a graying workforce” and subsequent
“drain of institutional memory.” Using the scale below, how would characterize this age
drain in your agency for the following years?
1=insignificant 2=moderately significant 3=significant 4=very significant 5= intense
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Scale

Q13: Some agencies focus on the control of expenses, others focus on efficiency, and a
third group of agencies is more concerned with the effectiveness of their outlays. Please
rate the importance of each by assigning a percentage weight (all weights should add to
100%):
Value
Percentage
Control
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Total
100%
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Q14: How would you characterize your agency performance management culture to the
extent division level budget allocations and individual salaries are driven by objective
achievement of results? On a scale from 1 to 100, please rate performance management
culture of your agency for each of the following years?
 1=last budget level and salaries are principal drivers
 100=budget allocations and salary increases based on the achievement of
predetermined performance levels
Year
Rate
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Q15: How would you assess your agency ability to track performance in real time using
information technology?
Letter Grade: A B
C
D
F
Q16: Transparency is an integral part of public management. How would a citizen with a
high-school diploma assess the transparency of your agency in term of performance
reporting?
Letter Grade: A
B
C
D
F
Q17: How would an elected official assess the transparency of your agency in term of
performance reporting?
Letter Grade: A
B
C
D
F
Part 3: Please answer the following question about your agency transportation
expenditure.
Q18: Please state the amount (in $) your agency spent on new construction and
maintenance of transportation infrastructure in the following years:
Year
New construction
Maintenance
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012
Please take a moment to tell us more about yourself (Optional):
State
Your Name
Your Title
Your agency
E-mail Address
Phone number
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Survey Findings
Part 1. Grant application
1.1. External consultant vs. staffing effort (Q1)
Year

Obs.

FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

15
15
15
15

External consultant
Mean Std. Dev.
27.53 34.93
28.80 35.16
30.00 37.18
27.47 35.97

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
90
90
90
90

Staffing effort
Mean Std. Dev.
48.07 41.56
48.13 42.12
46.33 43.63
50.27 43.43

Min
0
0
0
0

1.2. Costs of external consultants (Q2)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs.
9
9
10
10

Mean
548894.4
554653.6
495005
496005

Std. Dev.
1594523
1592385
1512959
1512606

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
4800000
4800000
4800000
4800000

Std. Dev.
25.54386
26.19625
27.88556
29.48968

Min
25
25
25
18

Max
100
100
100
100

1.3. Shovel readiness (Q3)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs.
14
13
14
13

Mean
80.78571
78.07692
77.71429
76.84615

1.4. Perception on congressional oversight (Q4)
Obs.
15

Mean
3.2

Std. Dev.
1.264911

Min
1

Max
5

1.5. Complexity of competitive grants applications (Q5)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs.
15
14
15
14

Mean
63.66667
62.14286
59.93333
58.21429

Std. Dev.
16.51262
11.61469
13.23667
12.70481
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Min
25
50
40
40

Max
92
93
92
93

Max
100
100
100
100

Part 2. Human resource management
2.1. PE designation (Q7) in workforce and Education level (Q8)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs. PE designation in workforce
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
11
13.11 10.82
3
37
11
13.33 10.77
3
36.9
11
13.23 10.58
3.8 36.4
11
13.15 10.54
3.7 36.1

Obs. % of advanced degree
Mean Std. Dev. Min
10
8.49 8.72
0.6
10
8.79 9.53
0.5
10
8.64 9.31
0.4
10
8.88 9.53
0.5

Max
24
28
27
28

2.2. Civil service protection (Q9) and voluntarily separated workforce (Q10)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs. PE designation in workforce
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
14
16.34 35.69
0
100
14
15.87 35.79
0
100
14
16.07 35.80
0
100
14
16.37 35.81
0
100

Obs. % of voluntary separation
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
12
12.31 22.23
3
82
12
13.09 24.47
1.7 90
13
13.02 22.54
2
87
13
12.41 22.97
1
88

2.3. Percentage of agency payroll regarding training and development programs (Q11)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs.
13
13
13
13

Mean
3.04
3.08
2.99
3.01

Std. Dev.
3.51
3.48
3.50
3.52

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
11
11
11
11

Std. Dev.
3.51
3.48
3.50
3.52

Min
0
0
0
0

Max
11
11
11
11

2.4. Performance budget (Q14)
Year
FY 2009
FY 2010
FY 2011
FY 2012

Obs.
13
13
13
13

Mean
3.04
3.08
2.99
3.01

2.5. Performance management and transparency
Question
IT utilization (Q15)
Citizens’ assessment (Q16)
Elected official’s assessment (Q17)

Obs.
16
16
16
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Mean
3.44
3.50
3.69

Std. Dev.
1.15
1.26
1.08

Min
1
1
1

Max
5
5
5

Part 3. New construction vs. maintenance cost (Q18)
Year

Obs. New construction
Mean Std. Dev.
FY 2009 12
1.70 2,926.03
FY 2010 12
1.70 1,951.26
FY 2011 12
1.40 2,155.89
FY 2012 12
1.40 2,169.97

Min
799.73
741.64
665.10
724.65

Max
855.11
737.74
664.32
801.90
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Obs. Maintenance
Mean Std. Dev.
12
133.00 3,119.55
12
124.00 2,685.60
12
122.35 3,150.25
12
122.34 3,819.27

Min
888.63
812.15
925.74
976.41

Max
1,004.82
867.46
1,052.48
1,208.65
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